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Identity and conflicts in the ethics of neural implants.
The iEMT articulates, firstly, that the co-extensivity of the mind and the world does not justify the dissolution of theMind in the objects of the external world with which the mind interacts, and the agent's mind is still part of his unique personal identity.
‘I Can’ vs. ‘I Want’: What’s Missing from Gallagher’s Picture of Non-reductive Cognitive Science
Abstract We support the development of non-reductive cognitive science and the naturalization of phenomenology for this purpose, and we agree that the ‘relational turn’ defended by Gallagher is a
Biology and Subjectivity: Philosophical Contributions to a Non-reductive Neuroscience
While reduction is still widely defended, in the last decades alternative views have gained credibility, to the extent that a “non-reductive science” is no longer dismissed as an oxymoron.
On the naturalisation of teleology: self-organisation, autopoiesis and teleodynamics
In recent decades, several theories have claimed to explain the teleological causality of organisms as a function of self-organising and self-producing processes. The most widely cited theories of ...
Widening the extended mind theory: the mind as a capacity
Neuroprosthetics INTRODUCTION. This a theoretical poster. Its explores the way for a comprehensive understanding of the human mind. Philosophers and neuroscientists often reject the claim that their
Neuroscience and subjectivity. A proposal for cooperation between neuroscience and some philosophical traditions
1. Hacker, P. S. M., Bennet, M. R. (2003) Philosophical foundations of Neuroscience, Blacwell, Malden. 2. Petitot, J., Varela, F. J., Pachoud, B., Roy, J.-M. (1999), Naturalizing Phenomenology.
Do Expectations Have Time Span?
If it is possible to think that human life is temporal as a whole, and we can make sense of Wittgenstein’s claim that the psychological phenomena called ‘dispositions’ do not have genuine temporal
Wittgenstein on Intentionality and Representation
Wittgenstein’s concept of intentionality is strongly connected with his views on language and thinking. Although his views progressively developed over time, Wittgenstein came to realise that
Psychology and mind in Aquinas
It is shown that self-consciousness is not necessarily a key to defining a human being, and based on Aquinas’s views, a distinction between what I will call ‘egos’ and ‘selves’ is drawn.