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Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
The interests and incentives of managers and shareholders conflict over such issues as the optimal size of the firm and the payment of cash to shareholders. These conflicts are especially severe in
Separation of Ownership and Control
This paper analyzes the survival of organizations in which decision agents do not bear a major share of the wealth effects of their decisions. This is what the literature on large corporations calls
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
Since 1973 technological, political, regulatory, and economic forces have been changing the worldwide economy in a fashion comparable to the changes experienced during the nineteenth century
The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964
In this paper I derive a risk-adjusted measure of portfolio performance (now known as Jensen's Alpha) that estimates how much a manager's forecasting ability contributes to the fund's returns. The
Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives
Our estimates of the pay-performance relation (including pay, options, stockholdings, and dismissal) for chief executive officers indicate that CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 change in
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
Since 1973 technological, political, regulatory, and economic forces have been changing the worldwide economy in a fashion comparable to the changes experienced during the nineteenth century
THEORY OF THE FIRM: MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR, AGENCY COSTS AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
In this paper we draw on recent progress in the theory of (1) property rights, (2) agency, and (3) finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm.1 In addition to tying together
Agency Problems and Residual Claims
Social and economic activities, like religion, entertainment, education, research, and the production of other goods and services, are carried on by different types of organizations, for example,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
This paper integrates elements from the theory of agency, the theory of property rights and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm. We define the concept of
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