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The Bipartisan Set of a Tournament Game
A tournament is a complete asymmetric binary relation U over a finite set X of outcomes. To a tournament we associate a two-player symmetric zero-sum game, in which each player chooses an outcome andExpand
Sequential Stackelberg equilibria in two-person games
The concept of sequential Stackelberg equilibrium is introduced in the general framework of dynamic, two-person games defined in the Denardo contracting operator formalism and can be related to previous results obtained by Başar and Haurie (1984). Expand
Equilibria in a Model with Partial Rivalry
Abstract In this paper we show that a non-cooperative game with a finite set of players and common finite strategy sets possesses a strong Nash equilibrium in pure strategies whenever individuals'Expand
Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Group Formation Game with Positive Externalities
Abstract This paper identifies a domain of payoff functions in no spillover noncooperative games with Positive externality which admit a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Since in general a NashExpand
Dynamically Consistent Beliefs Must Be Bayesian
Abstract Experimental evidence such as the Ellsberg Paradox contradicts the Savage model of decision making under uncertainty, since the representation of beliefs underlying preferces by a singleExpand
Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
We study the incentives of candidates to strategically affect the outcome of a voting procedure. We show that the outcomes of every nondictatorial voting procedure that satisfies unanimity will beExpand
More on the tournament equilibrium set
Schwartz (1990) a propose un nouveau concept de solution pour le choix dans un tournoi, appele Tournament Equilibrium Set (Ensemble d'equilibre d'un tournoi). Il a pose quatre probemes a propos deExpand
Supplier selection-order allocation: A two stage multiple criteria dynamic programming approach
This paper proposes a two-stage multiple criteria dynamic programming approach for two of the most critical tasks in supply chain management, namely, supplier selection and order allocation. In theExpand
Conflict and Cooperation: The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Common Agency
This paper provides a set of theoretical results to identify the structure of equilibrium payoffs with special attention to the payoff of the agent and illustrates this user guide on a wide and diverse family of applications including auctions, competition for an input, economic influence, and private production of public goods. Expand
Strongly balanced cooperative games
Kaneko/Wooders (1982) derived a list of necessary and sufficient conditions for a partitioning game to have a nonempty core regardless of the payoff functions of its effective coalitions. The mainExpand