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Evolution of Grim Trigger in Prisoner Dilemma Game with Partial Imitation
TLDR
The emergence of Grim Trigger as the dominant strategy in the Iterated Prisoner Dilemma (IPD) on a square lattice is investigated for players with finite memory, using three different kinds of imitation rule: the traditional imitation rule where the entire data base of the opponent’s moves is copied, and the two more realistic partial imitation rules. Expand
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Partial Imitation Rule in Iterated Prisoner Dilemma Game on a Square Lattice
TLDR
A realistic replacement of the general imitation rule in Iterated Prisoner Dilemma (IPD) is investigated with simulation on square lattice, whereby the player, with finite memory, can only imitate those behaviors of the opponents observed in past games. Expand
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Partial Imitation Hinders Emergence of Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Direct Reciprocity
TLDR
The evolutionary time scales for various strategies in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma on a fully connected network are investigated for players with finite memory, using two different kinds of imitation rules: the (commonly used) traditional imitation rule where the entire meta-strategy of the role model is copied, and the partial imitation Rule where only the observed subset of moves is copied. Expand
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Imitation with incomplete information in 2x2 games
TLDR
In the iterated prisoner dilemma, we compare a restricted imitation process, in which unused parts of the role model's meta-strategy are hidden from the imitator, with the widely used imitation rule that allows the imITator to adopt the entire meta-Strategy. Expand
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Phase diagram of Symmetric Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma of Two-Companies with Partial Imitation Rule
TLDR
The problem of two companies of agents with one-step memory playing game is investigated in the context of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma under partial imitation rule, where a player can imitate only those moves that he has observed in his games with his opponent. Expand