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Pairwise Kidney Exchange
In connection with an earlier paper on the exchange of live donor kidneys (Roth, Sonmez, and Unver 2004) the authors entered into discussions with New England transplant surgeons and their colleagues in the transplant community, aimed at implementing a Kidney Exchange program. Expand
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Increasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation by Matching for Two- and Three-Way Exchanges
Background. To expand the opportunity for paired live donor kidney transplantation, computerized matching algorithms have been designed to identify maximal sets of compatible donor/recipient pairsExpand
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Incentive Compatible Allocation and Exchange of Discrete Resources
Allocation and exchange of discrete resources such as kidneys, school seats, and many other resources for which agents have single-unit demand is conducted via direct mechanisms without monetaryExpand
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Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignmentsExpand
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A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England.
In 2003 there were 8,665 transplants of deceased donor kidneys for the approximately 60,000 patients waiting for such transplants in the United States. While waiting, 3,436 patients died. There wereExpand
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Dynamic Kidney Exchange
We study how barter exchanges should be conducted through a centralized mechanism in a dynamically evolving agent pool with time- and compatibility-based preferences. We derive the dynamicallyExpand
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Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-intern Markets
We analyze capacity manipulation games in hospital-intern markets inspired by the real-life entry-level labor markets for young physicians who seek residencies at hospitals. Expand
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Course Bidding at Business Schools
Mechanisms that rely on course bidding are widely used at business schools in order to allocate seats at oversubscribed courses. Bids play two key roles under these mechanisms: to infer studentExpand
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A theory of school‐choice lotteries
A new centralized mechanism was introduced in New York City and Boston to assign students to public schools in district school-choice programs. This mechanism was advocated for its superior fairnessExpand
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Room assignment-rent division: A market approach
We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism which yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness. Expand
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