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- Publications
- Influence
Pairwise Kidney Exchange
TLDR
Increasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation by Matching for Two- and Three-Way Exchanges
- S. Saidman, A. Roth, T. Sönmez, M. Ünver, F. Delmonico
- Medicine
- Transplantation
- 15 March 2006
Background. To expand the opportunity for paired live donor kidney transplantation, computerized matching algorithms have been designed to identify maximal sets of compatible donor/recipient pairs… Expand
Incentive Compatible Allocation and Exchange of Discrete Resources
Allocation and exchange of discrete resources such as kidneys, school seats, and many other resources for which agents have single-unit demand is conducted via direct mechanisms without monetary… Expand
Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- T. Hashimoto, D. Hirata, Onur Kesten, Morimitsu Kurino, M. Ünver
- Mathematics, Economics
- 2014
This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments… Expand
A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England.
In 2003 there were 8,665 transplants of deceased donor kidneys for the approximately 60,000 patients waiting for such transplants in the United States. While waiting, 3,436 patients died. There were… Expand
Dynamic Kidney Exchange
- M. Ünver
- Economics
- 11 March 2007
We study how barter exchanges should be conducted through a centralized mechanism in a dynamically evolving agent pool with time- and compatibility-based preferences. We derive the dynamically… Expand
Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-intern Markets
- H. Konishi, M. Ünver
- Economics, Computer Science
- Soc. Choice Welf.
- 10 June 2006
TLDR
Course Bidding at Business Schools
Mechanisms that rely on course bidding are widely used at business schools in order to allocate seats at oversubscribed courses. Bids play two key roles under these mechanisms: to infer student… Expand
A theory of school‐choice lotteries
- Onur Kesten, M. Ünver
- Economics
- 1 May 2015
A new centralized mechanism was introduced in New York City and Boston to assign students to public schools in district school-choice programs. This mechanism was advocated for its superior fairness… Expand
Room assignment-rent division: A market approach
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu, T. Sönmez, M. Ünver
- Business, Economics
- Soc. Choice Welf.
- 1 June 2004
TLDR