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- Federico Echenique, M. Bumin Yenmez
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2007

We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents’ preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The… (More)

- Lars Ehlers, Isa Emin Hafalir, M. Bumin Yenmez, Muhammed A. Yildirim
- J. Economic Theory
- 2014

Controlled choice over public schools attempts giving parents selection options while maintaining diversity of different student types. In practice, diversity constraints are often enforced by setting hard upper bounds and hard lower bounds for each student type. We demonstrate that, with hard bounds, there might not exist assignments that satisfy standard… (More)

- Michael Schwarz, M. Bumin Yenmez
- J. Economic Theory
- 2011

We define the median stable matching for two-sided matching markets with wages and prove constructively that it exists. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78.

- FUHITO KOJIMA, Alvin E. Roth, +5 authors M. Bumin Yenmez
- 2007

In two-sided matching markets in which some doctors form couples, we present an algorithm that finds all the stable matchings whenever one exists, and otherwise shows that there is no stable matching. Extending the methodology of Echenique and Yenmez (2006), we characterize the set of stable matchings as the fixed points of a monotone decreasing function… (More)

- Marek Pycia, M. Bumin Yenmez
- EAI Endorsed Trans. Collaborative Computing
- 2016

We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets: We establish the existence of stable matchings provided that externalities are positive and agents’ choices satisfy substitutability, and we show that the standard insights of matching theory, such as the existence of side optimal stable matchings and the rural hospitals… (More)

- M. Bumin Yenmez
- 2009

This paper analyzes position auctions with general pricing rules. In these auctions, there are several items to be allocated which are commonly ranked by agents with unit demand. The preeminent example of position auctions is the “generalized second-price” (GSP) auction used by major search engines to sell online advertising. Edelman et al. (2007) establish… (More)

I study a market where agents with unit demand jointly own heterogeneous goods. In this market, the existence of an efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget balanced mechanism depends on the shares of the agents. I characterize the set of shares for which having such a mechanism is possible. This set includes the symmetric… (More)

- Alexey Kushnir, Shuo Liu, +7 authors Mehmet Bumin Yenmez
- 2015

We extend the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation established by Gershkov et al. (Econometrica, 2013) to environments with non-linear utilities satisfying the average single-crossing property and the convex-valued assumption. The new equivalence result produces novel implications to the literature on the principal-agent problem… (More)

- M. Bumin Yenmez
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2015

- Peter Chen, Michael Egesdal, Marek Pycia, M. Bumin Yenmez
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2016

We show that generalized median stable matchings exist in many-to-many matching markets when contracts are strong substitutes and satisfy the law of aggregate demand.