The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of Summary We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents'… (More)
Controlled choice over public schools attempts giving parents selection options while maintaining diversity of different student types. In practice, diversity constraints are often enforced by setting hard upper bounds and hard lower bounds for each student type. We demonstrate that, with hard bounds, there might not exist assignments that satisfy standard… (More)
We define the median stable matching for two-sided matching markets with wages and prove constructively that it exists. Michael Ostrovsky, the editor and two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. We also thank Federico Echenique for detailed comments on an earlier draft.
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets: We establish the existence of stable matchings provided that externalities are positive and agents' choices satisfy substitutability, and we show that the standard insights of matching theory, such as the existence of side optimal stable matchings and the rural hospitals… (More)
In two-sided matching markets in which some doctors form couples, we present an algorithm that finds all the stable matchings whenever one exists, and otherwise shows that there is no stable matching. Extending the methodology of Echenique and Yenmez (2006), we characterize the set of stable matchings as the fixed points of a monotone decreasing function… (More)
This paper analyzes position auctions with general pricing rules. In these auctions, there are several items to be allocated which are commonly ranked by agents with unit demand. The preeminent example of position auctions is the " generalized second-price " (GSP) auction used by major search engines to sell online advertising. Edelman et al. (2007)… (More)
I study a market where agents with unit demand jointly own heterogeneous goods. In this market, the existence of an efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget balanced mechanism depends on the shares of the agents. I characterize the set of shares for which having such a mechanism is possible. This set includes the symmetric… (More)
to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance: Theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms. Promoting school competition through school choice: A market design approach. Stanford Graduate School of Business Working Paper, 2012. Caterina Calsamiglia and Antonio Miralles. All about priorities: No school choice under the presence of bad schools.