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The Strategic Role of Nonbinding Communication
TLDR
This paper develops a model of strategic communication, based on the conflict game with perfect information, in which a noisy commitment message is sent by a better-informed sender to a receiver who takes an action that determines the welfare of both.
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The bargaining power of commitment: An experiment of the effects of threats in the sequential hawk–dove game
This article studies experimentally the conditions that improve bargaining power by means of threats. The analysis centers on three essential elements of the commitment: the possibility of announcing…
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Never retreat, never surrender: The bargaining power of commitment in the Hawk-Dove game
This paper studies experimentally the conditions that improve bargaining power using threats in a negotiation process. Following Schelling’s (1960) ideas we choose the hawk-dove game because is the…
Religious Activities in Bucaramanga: An Approach from the Economy
This paper explores the religious behavior of the inhabitants of Bucaramanga from the analytical perspective known as economics of religion. By considering religious practice as a rational choice…
ACTIVIDADES RELIGIOSAS EN BUCARAMANGA: UNA APROXIMACIÓN DESDE LA ECONOMÍA
Este documento explora el comportamiento religioso de los habitantes de la ciudad de Bucaramanga desde la perspectiva analitica conocida como economia de la religion. Considerando la practica…
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