Luigia Carlucci Aiello

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Formal verification of security protocols has become a key issue in computer security. Yet, it has proven to be a hard task often error prone and discouraging for non-experts in formal methods. In this paper we show how security protocols can be specified and verified efficiently and effectively by embedding reasoning about actions into a logic programming(More)
We illustrate <i>AL<inf>SP</inf></i> (Action Language for Security Protocol), a declarative executable specification language for planning attacks to security protocols. <i>AL<inf>SP</inf></i> is based on logic programming with negation as failure, and with stable model semantics. In <i>AL<inf>SP</inf></i> we can give a declarative specification of a(More)
We present a general proof theoretical methodology for default systems. Given a default theory W, D, the default rules D are simply understood as restrictions on the tableaux construction of the logic. Different default approaches have their own way of understanding these restrictions and executing them. For each default approach (such as Reiter, Brewka or(More)
We show that modal logics characterized by a class of frames satisfying the insertion property are suitable for Reiter's default logic. We reene the canonical x point construction deened by Marek, Schwarz and Truszczy nski for Reiter's default logic and thus we address a new paradigm for nonmonotonic logic. In fact, diierently from the construction deened(More)