Lucy White

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This paper presents the first model where entry deterrence takes place through financial rather than product-market channels. In standard models of the interaction between product and financial markets, a firm's use of financial instruments deters entry by affecting product market behavior, whereas in our model entry deterrence occurs by affecting the(More)
We investigate the outcome of bargaining when a player's pay-off from agreement is risky. We find that a risk-averse player typically increases his equilibrium receipts when his pay-off is made risky. This is because the presence of risk makes individuals behave " more patiently " in bargaining. Strong analogies are drawn to the precautionary saving(More)
How does gender-balance affect the working of boards of directors? I examine boards that have been required for two decades to be relatively gender-balanced: boards of business companies in which the Israeli government holds a substantial equity interest. I construct a novel database based on the detailed minutes of 402 board-and board-committee meetings of(More)
Tirole and three anonymous referees for helpful comments. We would also like to thank conference and seminar participants at the AFA 2003, INSEAD, Goethe University in Frankfurt, SOAS, the Stockholm School of Economics, the CEPR workshop on The New Economy and the Oxford Finance Summer Symposium. We are responsible for any errors and omissions in the paper.(More)
1 We analyze bidding behavior in auctions when risk-averse buyers bid for a good whose value is risky. We show that when the risk in the valuations increases, DARA bidders will reduce their bids by more than the appropriate increase in the risk premium. Ceteris paribus, buyers will be better off bidding for a more risky object in first price, second price,(More)
à OLIVER BOARD w There are many laws that require sellers to disclose private information about the quality of their products. But the theoretical justification for these laws is not obvious: economic theory predicts that a seller will voluntarily disclose such quality information, however unfavorable, as long as it is costless to do so. Here we show that(More)
In this paper we address the question as to why fund managers may trade on short-term information in a financial market that offers more profitable trading on long-term information. We consider a setting in which a fund manager's ability is unknown and an investor uses performance observations to learn about this ability. We show that an investor learns(More)