• Publications
  • Influence
Corporate Governance and Risk Taking
Better investor protection could lead corporations to undertake riskier but value-enhancing investments. For example, better investor protection mitigates the taking of private benefits leading toExpand
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Creditor Rights and Corporate Risk-Taking
We propose that stronger creditor rights in bankruptcy affect corporate investment choice by reducing corporate risk-taking. In cross-country analysis, we find that stronger creditor rights induceExpand
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Can Mutual Fund Managers Pick Stocks? Evidence from Their Trades Prior to Earnings Announcements
Recent research finds that the stocks that mutual fund managers buy outperform the stocks that they sell (e.g., Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000)). We study the nature of this stock-pickingExpand
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Corporate Strategy, Analyst Coverage, and the Uniqueness Paradox
TLDR
We present evidence that managers face a paradox in selecting strategy. Expand
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Shared Auditors in Mergers and Acquisitions
We examine the impact of shared auditors, defined as audit firms that provide audit services to a target and its acquirer firm prior to an acquisition, on transaction outcomes. We find sharedExpand
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Corporate Governance and Financing Policy: New Evidence
Prior research has often taken the view that entrenched managers tend to avoid debt. Contrary to this view, I find that firms with weak shareholder rights, as measured by the Gompers et al. (2003)Expand
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Large Investors, Price Manipulation, and Limits to Arbitrage: An Anatomy of Market Corners
Corners were prevalent in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. We first develop a rational expectations model of corners and show that they can arise as the result of rational behavior. Then,Expand
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Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure: New Evidence
Prior research has often taken the view that entrenched managers tend to avoid debt. Contrary to this view, we find that firms with entrenched managers, as measured by the Gompers et al. (2003)Expand
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Lawyers and Fools: Lawyer-Directors in Public Corporations
The accepted wisdom — that a lawyer who becomes a corporate director has a fool for a client — is outdated. The benefits of lawyer-directors in today’s world significantly outweigh the costs. BeyondExpand
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Financial Accounting Characteristics and Debt Covenants
We examine the relation between financial accounting characteristics and accounting-based debt covenants. We hypothesize that use of accounting-based covenants is more likely when asymmetricExpand
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