Louis-André Gérard-Varet

Learn More
We present a new condition on beliefs that guarantee the Bayesian implementability of all efficient social decision rules. We show that this condition is easy to verify and is both more interpretable and more general than the conditions that are found in the literature. We also study conditions guaranteeing the Bayesian implementability of all social(More)
In a Bayesian framework, when the relevant information is dispersed among several agents, the designer of a decision mechanism must take into account what they know about each other. Many authors have exploited the general properties of such information structures to construct decision procedures or contracts in many different types of allocation problems.(More)
We argue that for the case of heterogeneous commodities with infrequent tradings, such as paintings, it is relevant to base a price index on hedonic regressions using all sales and not resales only. To support this conclusion we construct a price index for paintings by Impressionists and their followers and compare the various estimators using bootstrapping(More)
This paper deals with issues concerning the core as a solution concept for games in coalitional form as well as the use of these games in representing economies of a certain formal type. Side-payment games are imbedded in the more general class of no-side-payment games. It is shown that to a given side-payment game having an empty core one may associate two(More)
  • 1