We prove that for Copeland, maximin, Bucklin, and ranked pairs, the necessary winner problem is coNP-complete; also, we give a sufficient condition on scoring rules for the possible winner problem to be NP-complete (Borda satisfies this condition).Expand

In many real-world group decision making problems, the set of alternatives is a Cartesian product of finite value domains for each of a given set of variables (or issues).Expand

This paper develops conditions on general random utility models that enable fast inference within a Bayesian framework through MC-EM, providing concave log-likelihood functions and bounded sets of global maxima solutions.Expand

In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budget constraints.Expand

We show that when the manipulator only has partial information about the votes of the non-manipulators, computing a dominating manipulation is NP-hard for many common voting rules.Expand

We design an incentive mechanism based on all-pay auctions for participatory sensing that induces the maximum profit for the principal, while satisfying strict individual rationality for both risk-neutral and weakly risk-averse agents.Expand

We investigate the computational complexity and (in)approximability of computing the margin of victory for various voting rules, including approval voting, all positional scoring rules (which include Borda, plurality, and veto), plurality with runoff, Bucklin, Copeland, maximin, STV, and ranked pairs.Expand