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- Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
- AAAI
- 2008

Usually a voting rule requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. However, in some cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the alternatives. It has beenâ€¦ (More)

- Vincent Conitzer, Matthew Rognlie, Lirong Xia
- IJCAI
- 2009

A preference function (PF) takes a set of votes (linear orders over a set of alternatives) as input, and produces one or more rankings (also linear orders over the alternatives) as output. Suchâ€¦ (More)

In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budget constraints. Whenâ€¦ (More)

- Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
- EC
- 2008

We introduce a class of voting rules called <i>generalized scoring rules</i>. Under such a rule, each vote generates a vector of <i>k</i> scores, and the outcome of the voting rule is based only onâ€¦ (More)

- Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
- EC
- 2008

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that (in unrestricted settings) any reasonable voting rule is manipulable. Recently, a quantitative version of this theorem was proved by Ehud Friedgut, Gilâ€¦ (More)

- JÃ©rÃ´me Lang, Lirong Xia
- Mathematical Social Sciences
- 2009

In many real-world group decision making problems, the set of alternatives is a Cartesian product of finite value domains for each of a given set of variables (or issues). Dealing with such domainsâ€¦ (More)

Understanding the computational complexity of manipulation in elections is arguably the most central agenda in Computational Social Choice. One of the influential variations of the the problemâ€¦ (More)

- Lirong Xia
- EC
- 2012

The margin of victory of an election, defined as the smallest number k such that k voters can change the winner by voting differently, is an important measurement for robustness of the electionâ€¦ (More)

- Vincent Conitzer, Toby Walsh, Lirong Xia
- AAAI
- 2011

We consider manipulation problems when the manipulator only has partial information about the votes of the nonmanipulators. Such partial information is described by an information set, which is theâ€¦ (More)

- Tie Luo, Hwee Pink Tan, Lirong Xia
- IEEE INFOCOM 2014 - IEEE Conference on Computerâ€¦
- 2014

We design an incentive mechanism based on all-pay auctions for participatory sensing. The organizer (principal) aims to attract a high amount of contribution from participating users (agents) whileâ€¦ (More)