• Publications
  • Influence
Determining Possible and Necessary Winners under Common Voting Rules Given Partial Orders
TLDR
We prove that for Copeland, maximin, Bucklin, and ranked pairs, the necessary winner problem is coNP-complete; also, we give a sufficient condition on scoring rules for the possible winner problem to be NP-complete (Borda satisfies this condition). Expand
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Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains
TLDR
In many real-world group decision making problems, the set of alternatives is a Cartesian product of finite value domains for each of a given set of variables (or issues). Expand
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Random Utility Theory for Social Choice
TLDR
This paper develops conditions on general random utility models that enable fast inference within a Bayesian framework through MC-EM, providing concave log-likelihood functions and bounded sets of global maxima solutions. Expand
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Incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi-unit auctions
TLDR
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budget constraints. Expand
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Preference Functions that Score Rankings and Maximum Likelihood Estimation
TLDR
We define simple ranking scoring functions (SRSFs) and show that they are exactly the class of neutral PFs that are MLEs for some noise model. Expand
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Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
TLDR
We introduce a class of voting rules called <i>generalized scoring rules</i>. Expand
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Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules
TLDR
We study the computational complexity of the unweighted coalitional manipulation problem (UCM) under several prominent voting rules. Expand
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Dominating Manipulations in Voting with Partial Information
TLDR
We show that when the manipulator only has partial information about the votes of the non-manipulators, computing a dominating manipulation is NP-hard for many common voting rules. Expand
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Profit-maximizing incentive for participatory sensing
TLDR
We design an incentive mechanism based on all-pay auctions for participatory sensing that induces the maximum profit for the principal, while satisfying strict individual rationality for both risk-neutral and weakly risk-averse agents. Expand
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Computing the margin of victory for various voting rules
TLDR
We investigate the computational complexity and (in)approximability of computing the margin of victory for various voting rules, including approval voting, all positional scoring rules (which include Borda, plurality, and veto), plurality with runoff, Bucklin, Copeland, maximin, STV, and ranked pairs. Expand
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