Liron Ravner

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We provide Game-theoretic analysis of the arrival process to a multi-server system with a limited queue buffer, which admits customers only during a finite time interval. A customer who arrives at a full system is blocked and does not receive service. Customers can choose their arrival times with the goal of minimizing their probability of being blocked. We(More)
We study a single server model with no queue and exponential services times, in which service is only provided during a certain time interval. A number of customers wish to obtain this service and can choose their arrival time. A customer that finds a busy server leaves without being served. We model this scenario as a non-cooperative game in which the(More)
We consider a discrete population of users with homogeneous service demand who need to decide when to arrive to a system in which the service rate deteriorates linearly with the number of users in the system. The users have heterogeneous desired departure times from the system, and their goal is to minimize a weighted sum of the travel time and square(More)
We consider a game of decentralized timing of jobs to a single server (machine) with a penalty for deviation from some due date and no delay costs. The jobs sizes are homogeneous and deterministic. Each job belongs to a single decision maker, a customer, who aims to arrive at a time that minimizes his deviation penalty. If multiple customers arrive at the(More)
We study the strategic purchasing of priorities in a time-dependent accumulating priority M/G/1 queue. We formulate a non-cooperative game in which customers purchase priority coefficients with the goal of reducing (possibly heterogeneous) waiting costs in exchange. The priority of each customer in the queue is a linear function of the individual waiting(More)
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