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- Rafael Pass, Lior Seeman, Abhi Shelat
- IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
- 2016

Nakamoto’s famous blockchain protocol enables achieving consensus in a so-called permissionless setting—anyone can join (or leave) the protocol execution, and the protocol instructions do not depend on the identities of the players. His ingenious protocol prevents “sybil attacks” (where an adversary spawns any number of new players) by relying on… (More)

- Lior Seeman, Yaron Singer
- 2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of…
- 2013

The algorithmic challenge of maximizing information diffusion through word-of-mouth processes in social networks has been heavily studied in the past decade. While there has been immense progress and an impressive arsenal of techniques has been developed, the algorithmic frameworks make idealized assumptions regarding access to the network that can often… (More)

The Adaptive Seeding problem is an algorithmic challenge motivated by influence maximization in social networks: One seeks to select among certain accessible nodes in a network, and then select, adaptively, among neighbors of those nodes as they become accessible in order to maximize a global objective function. More generally, adaptive seeding is a… (More)

- Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass, Lior Seeman
- AAAI
- 2012

We show that by modeling people as bounded finite automata, we can capture at a qualitative level the behavior observed in experiments. We consider a decision problem with incomplete information and a dynamically changing world, which can be viewed as an abstraction of many real-world settings. We provide a simple strategy for a finite automaton in this… (More)

- Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass, Lior Seeman
- ITCS
- 2014

We study the problem of computing an ε-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players as polynomial-time Turing machines that maintain state (rather than stateless polynomial-time Turing machines)---and make… (More)

- Aviad Rubinstein, Lior Seeman, Yaron Singer
- EC
- 2015

Adapting Seeding is a key algorithmic challenge of influence maximization in social networks. One seeks to select among certain available nodes in a network, and then, adaptively, among neighbors of those nodes as they become available, in order to maximize influence in the overall network. Despite recent strong approximation results [Seeman and Singer… (More)

- Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass, Lior Seeman
- Topics in cognitive science
- 2014

There have been two major lines of research aimed at capturing resource-bounded players in game theory. The first, initiated by Rubinstein (), charges an agent for doing costly computation; the second, initiated by Neyman (), does not charge for computation, but limits the computation that agents can do, typically by modeling agents as finite automata. We… (More)

- Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass, Lior Seeman
- WINE
- 2014

We study the problem of finding a subgame-perfect equilibrium in repeated games. In earlier work [Halpern, Pass and Seeman 2014], we showed how to efficiently find an (approximate) Nash equilibrium if assuming that players are computationally bounded (and making standard cryptographic hardness assumptions); in contrast, as demonstrated in the work of Borgs… (More)

- Konstantinos Mamouras, Sigal Oren, Lior Seeman, Lucja Kot, Johannes Gehrke
- PVLDB
- 2012

Coordination is a challenging everyday task; just think of the last time you organized a party or a meeting involving several people. As a growing part of our social and professional life goes online, an opportunity for an improved coordination process arises. Recently, Gupta et al. proposed entangled queries as a declarative abstraction for data-driven… (More)

- Lior Seeman
- ArXiv
- 2012

Motivated by cost of computation in game theory, we explore how changing the utilities of players (changing their complexity costs) affects the outcome of a game. We show that even if we improve a player’s utility in every action profile, his payoff in equilibrium might be lower than in the equilibrium before the change. We provide some conditions on games… (More)