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We present derivative-based necessary and sufficient conditions ensuring player strategies constitute local Nash equilibria in non-cooperative continuous games. Our results can be interpreted as generalizations of analogous second-order conditions for local optimality from nonlinear programming and optimal control theory. Drawing on this analogy, we propose(More)
Provided an arbitrary nonintrusive load monitoring (NILM) algorithm, we seek bounds on the probability of distinguishing between scenarios, given an aggregate power consumption signal. We introduce a framework for studying a general NILM algorithm, and analyze the theory in the general case. Then, we specialize to the case where the error is Gaussian. In(More)
Blind system identification is known to be an ill-posed problem and without further assumptions, no unique solution is at hand. In this contribution, we are concerned with the task of identifying an ARX model from only output measurements. We phrase this as a constrained rank minimization problem and present a relaxed convex formulation to approximate its(More)
— This paper investigates the use of pricing mechanisms as a means to achieve a desired feedback control strategy among selfish agents in the context of HVAC resource allocation in buildings. We pose the problem of resource allocation as a linear-quadratic game with many dynamically coupled zone occupants(agents) and an uncoupled social planner. The social(More)
We investigate the use of pricing mechanisms as a means to achieve a desired feedback control strategy among selfish agents. We study a hierarchical linear-quadratic game with many dynamically coupled Nash followers and an uncoupled leader. The leader influences the game by choosing the quadratic dependence on control actions for each follower's cost(More)
The energy disaggregation problem is recovering device level power consumption signals from the aggregate power consumption signal for a building. We show in this paper how the disaggregation problem can be reformulated as an adaptive filtering problem. This gives both a novel disaggregation algorithm and a better theoretical understanding for(More)
Ahstract-Energy disaggregation, also known as non­ intrusive load monitoring (NILM), is the task of separating aggregate energy data for a whole building into the energy data for individual appliances. Studies have shown that simply providing disaggregated data to the consumer improves energy consumption behavior. However, placing individual sensors on(More)
We present analysis and results of a social game encouraging energy efficient behavior in occupants by distributing points which determine the likelihood of winning in a lottery. We estimate occupants utilities and formulate the interaction between the building manager and the occupants as a reversed Stackelberg game in which there are multiple followers(More)
The utility company has many motivations for modifying energy consumption patterns of consumers such as revenue decoupling and demand response programs. We model the utility company–consumer interaction as a reverse Stackelberg game and present an iterative algorithm to design incentives for consumers while estimating their utility functions. Incentives are(More)