Li-Sha Huang

Learn More
We show that the problem of finding an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium of an n × n two-person games can be reduced to the computation of an (ǫ/n) 2-approximate market equilibrium of a Leontief economy. Together with a recent result of Chen, Deng and Teng, this polynomial reduction implies that the Leontief market exchange problem does not have a fully(More)
We consider the computational complexity of the market equilibrium problem by exploring the structural properties of the Leontief exchange economy. We prove that, for economies guaranteed to have a market equilibrium, finding one with maximum social welfare or maximum individual welfare is NP-hard. In addition, we prove that counting the number of(More)
We consider a social optimization model of pricing scheme in single-minded auctions , in cases where Walrasian equilibrium does not exist. We are interested in maximization of the ratio, R, of happy bidders over all agents, in a feasible allocation-pricing scheme. We show NP-hardness of the optimization problem, establish lower and upper bounds of R, as(More)