Leo Simon

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1 This paper offers a new approach to the study of economic problems usually modeled as games of incomplete information with discontinuous payoffs. Typically, the discontinuities arise from indeterminacies (ties) in the underlying problem. The point of view taken here is that the tie-breaking rules that resolve these indeterminacies should be viewed as part(More)
numerous seminar participants for helpful discussions and comments. We thank Dilek Uz for invaluable research assistance. Fowlie thanks the Energy Instute at Haas for support under a research contract from the California Energy Commission. Muller thanks the United States Environmental Protection Agency for support under award: EPA-OPEI-NCEE-08-02. Abstract(More)
Stakeholder negotiation is an increasingly important policymaking tool. However, relatively little is understood about the relationship between the structure of the negotiating process and the effectiveness with which participating stakeholders can pursue their individual interests. In this paper, we apply the Rausser-Simon multilateral bargaining model to(More)
The authors acknowledge the Office of the United States Trade Representative for partial sponsorship of this research, and Richard Cornes, Joseph Farrell and Devon Garvie for helpful suggestions. We are also grateful for the comments of three anonymous referees which have greatly improved the paper. We have also benefited from the comments of seminar(More)
Privatization and market liberalization are widely considered to be complementary reforms in transition economies. This article challenges this view and the closely related " big bang " approach: when pursued too vigorously, privatization may impede the transition process following liberalization. Our result is based on an explicit model of market learning.(More)
Stigma is a negative attribute of real estate acquired by the discovery of contamination and reflected in its value (Elliot-Jones, 1996). Using a theoretical model with external economies and adjustment costs, we show that both temporary stigma and permanent stigma are possible equilibrium outcomes after the discovery and cleanup of a hazardous waste site.(More)
Because carbon emissions create externalities across countries and generations , climate policy requires international cooperation and intergenerational altruism. A differential game using overlapping generations with intergener-ational altruism shows how altruism and cooperation interact, and provides estimates of their relative importance in determining(More)