Leif Danziger

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Joel Guttman1
Ig Horstman1
1Joel Guttman
1Ig Horstman
1Ted Bergstrom
1Robert Mcclelland
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  • Ted Bergstrom, Joel Guttman, Leif Danziger, Robert Mcclelland, Ig Horstman
  • 2003
I examine games involving private contributions to a public good and show that less of the public good will be supplied if agents move sequentially than if they move simultaneously. If the agents bid for the right to move first, the agent who values the public good least will win. If each agent chooses the rate at which he will subsidize the other agent's(More)
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