Informal arguments that cryptographic protocols are secure can be made rigorous using inductive definitions. The approach is based on ordinary predicate calculus and copes with infinite-stateâ€¦ (More)

Isabelle is a generic theorem prover, designed for interactive reasoning in a variety of formal theories. At present it provides useful proof procedures for Constructive Type Theory, variousâ€¦ (More)

Isabelle [28, 30] is an interactive theorem prover that supports a variety of logics. It represents rules as propositions (not as functions) and builds proofs by combining rules. These operationsâ€¦ (More)

Informal justifications of security protocols involve arguing backwards that various events are impossible. Inductive definitions can make such arguments rigorous. The resulting proofs areâ€¦ (More)

Internet browsers use security protocols to protect sensitive messages. An inductive analysis of TLS (a descendant of SSL 3.0) has been performed using the theorem prover Isabelle. Proofs are basedâ€¦ (More)

Many theorems involving special functions such as ln, exp and sin can be proved automatically by MetiTarski: a resolution theorem prover modified to call a decision procedure for the theory of realâ€¦ (More)

Sledgehammer is a component of Isabelle/HOL that employs resolution-based first-order automatic theorem provers (ATPs) to discharge goals arising in interactive proofs. It heuristically selectsâ€¦ (More)

Sledgehammer is a highly successful subsystem of Isabelle/HOL that calls automatic theorem provers to assist with interactive proof construction. It requires no user configuration: it can be invokedâ€¦ (More)

An operational model of crypto-protocols is tailored to the detailed analysis of the secrecy goals accomplished by Kerberos Version IV. The model is faithful to the specification of the protocolâ€¦ (More)