Laurent Franckx

Learn More
This work extends Lazear and Rosen's seminal paper to evaluate the performance of rank order tournaments when agents perform multiple tasks and the principal chooses, together with the prize spread, the weights assigned to each task in determining aggregate performance of each agent. All essential results of one−dimensional tournaments generalize to a(More)
We show that, under plausible hypotheses, an enforcement agency without commitment power will not undertake any enforcement e ort at all in a static game. Indeed, punishment of noncompliant agents brings no social bene ts in itself. In a dynamic framework, however, the enforcement agency might inspect private agents in order to develop a reputation that it(More)
We consider an inspection game between " n " polluting firms and an environmental enforcement agency. If the cost of monitoring ambient pollution is low enough, the optimal inspection policy consists in imposing the maximal possible fine, and mixing between observing ambient pollution and not conducting any inspection at all. However, with stringent upper(More)
We consider the determination of the optimal ne for noncompliance by a legislator who anticipates the inspection game between an autonomous inspection agency and polluting rms. This agency can make the inspection of individual rms contingent on ambient pollution. The agency's autonomy implies that it cannot commit itself to announced inspection(More)
Dynamic speed limits (DSL) are limits that change according to real-time traffic, road or weather conditions. In DSL-schemes road users are typically informed of speed limit changes by electronic signs that are housed within gantries situated above lanes. Dynamic speed limit systems are increasingly applied worldwide, usually on motorways. One of the(More)
A multi-task principal-agent model is employed to derive optimal environmental liability rules for risk neutral managers under two alternative organizational structures: a functional organization and a product-based organization. For a product-based organization it is shown that e¢ ciency is independent of whether the …rm or managers are liable for(More)
  • 1