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Illusion of Transparency
It's generally agreed that, for a certain a class of cases, a rational subject cannot be wrong in treating two elements of thought as co-referential. Even anti-individualists like Tyler Burge agreeExpand
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Why Be an Anti‐Individualist?
Anti-individualists claim that concepts are individuated with an eye to purely external facts about a subject’s environment about which she may be ignorant or mistaken. This paper offers a novelExpand
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The Limits of Conceptual Analysis
:  A priori conceptual analysis is once again part of the philosophical mainstream. Unlike their verificationist predecessors, modern conceptual analysts deny that we have armchair access to theExpand
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Considering empty worlds as actual
This paper argues that David Chalmer's new epistemic interpretation of 2-D semantics faces the very same type of objection he takes to defeat earlier contextualist interpretation of the 2-D framework.
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Bootstrapping our way to samesaying
This paper articulates two constraints on an acceptable account of meaning: (i) accessibility and (ii) flexibility. Expand
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Normative Concepts: A Connectedness Model
© 2014 Laura Schroeter & François Schroeter This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/014025/> A lthoughExpand
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Two-Dimensional Semantics
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Two‐Dimensional Semantics and Sameness of Meaning
In recent years, two-dimensional (2D) semantics has been used to develop a broadly descriptivist approach to meaning that seeks to accommodate externalists' counterexamples to traditional descriptivism. Expand
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Against a priori reductions
According to David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, conceptual competence puts one in a position to have a priori knowledge of conditional claims of the form ‘If my environment is thus and so, then waterExpand
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Reasons as right-makers
This paper sketches a right-maker account of normative practical reasons along functionalist lines. The approach is contrasted with other similar accounts, in particular John Broome's analysis ofExpand
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