Strategy-proof allocation of a Â®nite number of indivisible goods among a Â®nite number of individuals is considered. The main result is that in a pure distributional case, a mechanism isâ€¦ (More)

A number of jobs are to be assigned to a greater number of workers. While having to abide by the law of minimum wages, firms must determine who should be assigned which job and at what salary. Inâ€¦ (More)

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumptionâ€¦ (More)

In analyses of strategy-proof voting, two results feature prominently: the dictatorial characterization contained in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem and the voting by committees characterization inâ€¦ (More)

We extend the Shapley-Scarf (1974) model where a ...nite number of indivisible objects is to be allocated among a ...nite number of individuals to the case where the primary endowment set of anâ€¦ (More)

In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set A = A1 Ã— Â·Â· Â· Ã— Am of m finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy-proof social choice functionsâ€¦ (More)

This paper explores situations where tenants in public houses, in a specific neighborhood, are given the legislated right to buy the houses they live in or can choose to remain in their houses andâ€¦ (More)

This paper considers a house allocation problem with no initial ownership and where prices are bounded from below and above by exogenously given price restrictions. This type of housing marketâ€¦ (More)