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Recent studies have explored interactions between evolutionary game dynamics and population structure. Yet most studies so far mainly paid attention to unweighted and static networks. Here we explore evolutionary games played on dynamically weighted networks. Players update their strategies according to the payoffs they obtain. Players also update weights(More)
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in studying the role of costly punishment in promoting altruistic behaviors among selfish individuals. Rejections in ultimatum bargaining as a metaphor exemplify costly punishment, where the division of a sum of resources proposed by one side may be rejected by the other side, and both sides get nothing.(More)
Epidemic outbreaks have been shown to be closely related to the rendezvous-induced transmission of infection, which is caused by casual contact with infected individuals in public gatherings. To investigate rendezvous effects in the spread of infectious diseases, we propose an epidemic model on metapopulation networks bipartite-divided into two sets of(More)
We consider a dynamical network model in which a number of agents all move on the plane with the same constant absolute velocity. At each time step, each agent's direction is updated as the average of its direction plus the directions of other agents who can influence it. The influencing capability of each agent is represented by its influencing radius,(More)
With the help of mass media, people receive information concerning the status of an infectious disease to guide their mobility. Herein, we develop a theoretical framework to investigate the safety-information-driven human mobility with metapopulation epidemic dynamics. Individuals respond to the safety information of a city by taking safe moves (passing(More)
Since community structures in real networks play a major role for the epidemic spread, we therefore explore two interacting diseases spreading in networks with community structures. As a network model with community structures, we propose a random clique network model composed of different orders of cliques. We further assume that each disease spreads only(More)
An evolutionary battle-of-the-sexes game is proposed to model the opinion formation on networks. The individuals of a network are partitioned into different classes according to their unaltered opinion preferences, and their factual opinions are considered as the evolutionary strategies, which are updated with the birth-death or death-birth rules to imitate(More)
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations provide a new framework to understand the selection of traits with frequency-dependent fitness. Recently, a simple but fundamental law of evolutionary dynamics, which we call σ law, describes how to determine the selection between two competing strategies: in most evolutionary processes with two strategies, A(More)
We study the dynamics of epidemic spread in a system of mobile agents, where all agents move within the bounded square on a plane. Each agent moves with the same constant absolute velocity whose direction is updated according to the agents in his sensing neighbourhood. If the distance between a susceptible agent and an infected one is less than a given(More)