L. Starks

Publications131
h-index54
Citations19,955
Highly Influential Citations1,283
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Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation
We find that institutional ownership concentration is positively related to the pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation and negatively related to the level of compensation, even…
Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry
The authors test the hypothesis that, when their compensation is linked to relative performance, managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as 'losers' will manipulate fund risk differently…
Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long-Term Perspective
We report evidence on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover during the 1971 to 1994 period. We find that the nature of CEO turnover activity has changed over time. The frequencies of forced CEO…
Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors
We study shareholder proposals across a period of substantial activity and find systematic differences both across sponsor identity and across time. To understand how these proposals are perceived by…
The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States*
In the early 1900's American financial institutions were active participants in U.S. corporate governance but the enactment of securities laws in the 1930's limited the power of financial…
Behind the scenes: The corporate governance preferences of institutional investors
TLDR
It is found that long-term investors and investors that are less concerned about stock liquidity intervene more intensively and most investors use proxy advisors and believe that the information provided by such advisors improves their own voting decisions.
Active Institutional Shareholders and Costs of Monitoring: Evidence from Executive Compensation
Although evidence suggests that institutional investors play a role in monitoring management, not all institutions are equally willing or able to serve this function. We present a stylized model that…
Greener Pastures and the Impact of Dynamic Institutional Preferences
Although institutional investors have a preference for large capitalization stocks, over time they have shifted their preferences toward smaller, riskier securities. These changes in aggregate…
Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective
We examine the relation between corporate governance and ownership structure, focusing on the role of institutional investors. In many countries, institutional investors have become dominant players…
Conflicts of Interest in Sell-Side Research and the Moderating Role of Institutional Investors
Because sell-side analysts are dependent on institutional investors for performance ratings and trading commissions, we argue that analysts are less likely to succumb to investment banking or…
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