Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation
- Jay C. Hartzel, L. Starks
- Economics, Business
- 1 July 2000
We find that institutional ownership concentration is positively related to the pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation and negatively related to the level of compensation, even…
Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry
- K. Brown, W. V. Harlow, L. Starks
- Economics
- 1 March 1996
The authors test the hypothesis that, when their compensation is linked to relative performance, managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as 'losers' will manipulate fund risk differently…
Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long-Term Perspective
- M. Huson, R. Parrino, L. Starks
- Business, Environmental Science
- 1 December 2001
We report evidence on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover during the 1971 to 1994 period. We find that the nature of CEO turnover activity has changed over time. The frequencies of forced CEO…
Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors
- Stuart L. Gillan, L. Starks
- Business, Economics
- 1 August 2000
The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States*
- Stuart L. Gillan, L. Starks
- Business
- 2007
In the early 1900's American financial institutions were active participants in U.S. corporate governance but the enactment of securities laws in the 1930's limited the power of financial…
Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors
- J. McCahery, Z. Sautner, L. Starks
- Economics, Business
- 1 June 2015
It is found that long-term investors and investors that are less concerned about stock liquidity intervene more intensively and most investors use proxy advisors and believe that the information provided by such advisors improves their own voting decisions.
Active Institutional Shareholders and Costs of Monitoring: Evidence from Executive Compensation
- Andrés Almazán, Jay C. Hartzell, L. Starks
- Business, Economics
- 1 August 2005
Although evidence suggests that institutional investors play a role in monitoring management, not all institutions are equally willing or able to serve this function. We present a stylized model that…
Greener Pastures and the Impact of Dynamic Institutional Preferences
- James A. Bennett, R. Sias, L. Starks
- Economics
- 1 October 2003
Although institutional investors have a preference for large capitalization stocks, over time they have shifted their preferences toward smaller, riskier securities. These changes in aggregate…
Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective
- Stuart L. Gillan, L. Starks
- Economics, Business
- 1 August 2003
We examine the relation between corporate governance and ownership structure, focusing on the role of institutional investors. In many countries, institutional investors have become dominant players…
Conflicts of Interest in Sell-Side Research and the Moderating Role of Institutional Investors
- Alexander Ljungqvist, Felicia C. Marston, Hongjun Yan, L. Starks, Kelsey D. Wei
- Economics, Business
- 1 January 2005
Because sell-side analysts are dependent on institutional investors for performance ratings and trading commissions, we argue that analysts are less likely to succumb to investment banking or…
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