Skip to search formSkip to main contentSkip to account menu

Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation

We find that institutional ownership concentration is positively related to the pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation and negatively related to the level of compensation, even…
View on SSRN (opens in a new tab)

Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry

The authors test the hypothesis that, when their compensation is linked to relative performance, managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as 'losers' will manipulate fund risk differently…
View via Publisher (opens in a new tab)

Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long-Term Perspective

We report evidence on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover during the 1971 to 1994 period. We find that the nature of CEO turnover activity has changed over time. The frequencies of forced CEO…
View via Publisher (opens in a new tab)

Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors

View via Publisher (opens in a new tab)

The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States*

In the early 1900's American financial institutions were active participants in U.S. corporate governance but the enactment of securities laws in the 1930's limited the power of financial…
View on SSRN (opens in a new tab)

Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors

It is found that long-term investors and investors that are less concerned about stock liquidity intervene more intensively and most investors use proxy advisors and believe that the information provided by such advisors improves their own voting decisions.
View on SSRN (opens in a new tab)

Active Institutional Shareholders and Costs of Monitoring: Evidence from Executive Compensation

Although evidence suggests that institutional investors play a role in monitoring management, not all institutions are equally willing or able to serve this function. We present a stylized model that…
View on SSRN (opens in a new tab)

Greener Pastures and the Impact of Dynamic Institutional Preferences

Although institutional investors have a preference for large capitalization stocks, over time they have shifted their preferences toward smaller, riskier securities. These changes in aggregate…
View via Publisher (opens in a new tab)

Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective

We examine the relation between corporate governance and ownership structure, focusing on the role of institutional investors. In many countries, institutional investors have become dominant players…
View on SSRN (opens in a new tab)

Conflicts of Interest in Sell-Side Research and the Moderating Role of Institutional Investors

Because sell-side analysts are dependent on institutional investors for performance ratings and trading commissions, we argue that analysts are less likely to succumb to investment banking or…
View on SSRN (opens in a new tab)
...
By clicking accept or continuing to use the site, you agree to the terms outlined in our Privacy Policy (opens in a new tab), Terms of Service (opens in a new tab), and Dataset License (opens in a new tab)