• Publications
  • Influence
A Confutation of Convergent Realism
  • L. Laudan
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophy of Science
  • 1 March 1981
This essay contains a partial exploration of some key concepts associated with the epistemology of realist philosophies of science. It shows that neither reference nor approximate truth will do theExpand
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Progress and Its Problems
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Beyond positivism and relativism : theory, method and evidence
Introduction The Sins of the Fathers: Positivist Origins of Postpositivist Relativisms Theory And Evidence Demystifying Underdetermination Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination (with JarrettExpand
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Science and Relativism: Some Key Controversies in the Philosophy of Science
In recent years, many members of the intellectual community have embraced a radical relativism regarding knowledge in general and scientific knowledge in particular, holding that Kuhn, Quine, andExpand
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Science as Problem-Solving. (Book Reviews: Progress and Its Problems. Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth)
"A book that shakes philosophy of science to its roots. Laudan both destroys and creates. With detailed, scathing criticisms, he attacks the 'pregnant confusions' in extant philosophies of science.Expand
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Science and Hypothesis: Historical Essays on Scientific Methodology
This book consists of a collection of essays written between 1965 and 1981. Some have been published elsewhere; others appear here for the first time. Although dealing with different figures andExpand
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Why was the Logic of Discovery Abandoned
It is difficult to find a problem area in the philosophy of science about which more nonsense has been talked and in which more confusion reigns than ‘the philosophy of discovery’. It is even hard toExpand
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Science and Hypothesis
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Methodology's Prospects
  • L. Laudan
  • Political Science
  • PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the…
  • 1 January 1986
For positivists and post-positivists alike, methodology had a decidedly suspect status. Positivists saw methodological rules as stipulative conventions, void of any empirical content.Expand
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