Overconfidence in Probability and Frequency Judgments: A Critical Examination
The overconfidence observed in calibration studies has recently been questioned on both psychological and methodological grounds. In the first part of the article we discuss these issues and argue…
On the Psychology of Loss Aversion: Possession, Valence, and Reversals of the Endowment Effect
Loss aversion states that "losses loom larger than gains." We consider two types of loss aversion defined by two interpretations of loss. A loss can be defined (1) in terms of valence or (2) in terms…
Perspectives on Probability Judgment Calibration
Heuristics and Biases: The Calibration of Expert Judgment: Heuristics and Biases Beyond the Laboratory
Comparison, Grouping, and Preference
How does the attractiveness of a particular option depend on comparisons drawn between it and other alternatives? We observe that in many cases, comparisons hurt: When the options being compared have…
Feeling and Thinking in Memory-Based versus Stimulus-Based Choices
It is found that memory- based choices favor immediately compelling, affect-rich system 1 options, whereas stimulus-based choices favor affect-poor options whose attractiveness emerges from deliberative system 2 thought.
A random support model of the calibration of subjective probabilities
- L. Brenner
Focus, repacking, and the judgment of grouped hypotheses
Previous research has found that judged probabilities of two complementary singleton hypotheses sum to one. However, there may be important differences between judgment of singleton and disjunctive…
Subjective Probability of Disjunctive Hypotheses: Local-Weight Models for Decomposition of Evidential Support
A procedure for estimating local weights is described and a set of plausible properties that impose systematic ordinal relationships among local weights are introduced that accounts for nearly all of the variance in the probability judgments in these empirical tests.
Should observed overconfidence be dismissed as a statistical artifact? Critique of Erev, Wallsten, and Budescu (1994)
- L. Brenner
- EconomicsPsychological review
- 1 October 2000
It is argued in the present article that decomposing over- and underconfidence into true and artifactual components is inappropriate because the mistake stems from giving primacy to ambiguously defined model constructions (true judgments) over observed data.