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What Matters in Corporate Governance?
We investigate which provisions, among a set of twenty-four governance provisions followed by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), are correlated with firm value and stockholderExpand
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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
This paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive compensation, whichExpand
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The Costs of Entrenched Boards
This paper investigates empirically how the value of publicly traded firms is overall affected by arrangements protecting management from removal. A majority of U.S. public companies have staggeredExpand
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Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information
A model of parties' litigation and settlement decisions under imperfect information is studied. The model shows how informational asymmetry influences parties' decisions, and how it might lead toExpand
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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
This paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a managerial power' approach to executive compensation. Under this approach, the design of executiveExpand
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A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control
This paper develops a rent-protection theory of corporate ownership structure - and in particular, of the choice between concentrated and dispersed ownership of corporate shares and votes. The paperExpand
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Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation
This paper contains a draft of Part III of our forthcoming book, Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation (Harvard University Press, September 2004). The bookExpand
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The Growth of Executive Pay
This paper examines both empirically and theoretically the growth of U.S. executive pay during the period 1993-2003. During this period, pay has grown much beyond the increase that could be explainedExpand
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Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights
This paper examines common arrangements for separating control from cash flow rights: stock pyramids, cross-ownership structures, and dual class equity structures. We describe the ways in which suchExpand
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The CEO Pay Slice
We investigate the relationship between the CEO Pay Slice (CPS) – the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the top-five executive team captured by the CEO – and the value, performance, andExpand
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