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What Matters in Corporate Governance?
- L. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, Allen Ferrell
- Business
- 1 September 2004
We investigate which provisions, among a set of twenty-four governance provisions followed by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), are correlated with firm value and stockholder…
Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
- L. Bebchuk, J. Fried
- Business
- 6 January 2003
This paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a managerial power' approach to executive compensation. Under this approach, the design of executive…
Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation
- L. Bebchuk, J. Fried
- Business
- 22 November 2004
This paper contains a draft of Part III of our forthcoming book, Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation (Harvard University Press, September 2004). The book…
Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
- L. Bebchuk, J. Fried, D. Walker
- Business
- 1 June 2002
This paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive compensation, which…
The Costs of Entrenched Boards
- L. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen
- Business
- 1 June 2004
This paper investigates empirically how the value of publicly traded firms is overall affected by arrangements protecting management from removal. A majority of U.S. public companies have staggered…
The CEO Pay Slice
- L. Bebchuk, M. Cremers, U. Peyer
- Business
- 1 September 2010
We investigate the relation between the CEO Pay Slice (CPS)--the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the top-five executive team captured by the Chief Executive Officer--and the value,…
Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information
- L. Bebchuk
- Economics
- 23 January 1984
A model of parties' litigation and settlement decisions under imperfect information is studied. The model shows how informational asymmetry influences parties' decisions, and how it might lead to…
A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control
- L. Bebchuk
- Economics, Business
- 1 July 1999
This paper develops a rent-protection theory of corporate ownership structure - and in particular, of the choice between concentrated and dispersed ownership of corporate shares and votes. The paper…
Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights
- L. Bebchuk, Reinier H. Kraakman, George G. Triantis
- Business
- 1 February 1999
This paper examines common arrangements for separating control from cash flow rights: stock pyramids, cross-ownership structures, and dual class equity structures. We describe the ways in which such…
The Growth of Executive Pay
- L. Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein
- Economics
- 14 January 2005
This paper examines both empirically and theoretically the growth of U.S. executive pay during the period 1993-2003. During this period, pay has grown much beyond the increase that could be explained…
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