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Why Constitution Is Not Identity
L'A. developpe un argument essentialiste contre la these selon laquelle la constitution des choses materielles etablit une identite. Reprenant l'argument de la statue afin de montrer que le discoboleExpand
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The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism
Introduction 1. Beginning with the middle Part I. Everyday Things: 2. The reality of ordinary things 3. Artifacts 4. Human persons Part II. The Everyday World: 5. Commonsense causation 6.Expand
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The ontology of artifacts
Beginning with Aristotle, philosophers have taken artifacts to be ontologically deficient. This paper proposes a theory of artifacts, according to which artifacts are ontologically on a par withExpand
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Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective
Lynne Rudder Baker, "Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective": The first-person perspective poses a challenge to naturalism. Thomas Metzinger has proposed an intriguing account of theExpand
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The first-person perspective : A test for naturalism
Analyse conceptuelle ou prescientifique de la perspective de la premiere personne qui sous-tend la conscience de soi et constitue la propedeutique a toute science. Denoncant l'oubli de la perspectiveExpand
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Having thought: Essays in the metaphysics of mind.
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UNITY WITHOUT IDENTITY : A NEW LOOK AT MATERIAL CONSTITUTION
It is time to rethink age-old questions about material constitution. What is the relation between, say, a lump of clay and a statue that it makes up, or between a red and white piece of metal and aExpand
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Judgment and Justification.
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When does a person begin?
  • L. Baker
  • Philosophy, Medicine
  • Social philosophy & policy
  • 1 July 2005
According to the Constitution View of persons, a human person is wholly constituted by (but not identical to) a human organism. This view does justice both to our similarities to other animals and toExpand
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