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Do Actions Speak Louder than Words
We study the relative performance of disclosure and auditing in organizations. We consider the information transmission problem between two decision makers who take actions at dates 1 and 2Expand
Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature
This paper explores the extent to which the incompleteness of contracts can be attributed to their formal nature: the form, usually written, that contracts are required to take to be enforceable in aExpand
Path Dependence and Learning from Neighbors
We study the long-run properties of a class of locally interactive learning systems. A finite set of players at fixed locations play a two-by-two symmetric normal form game with strategicExpand
Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies
We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex-ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contractExpand
Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem
This paper explores the extent to which the presence of ex-ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify and investigate the basic 'hold-up problem'Expand
Structural Stability Implies Robustness to Bounded Rationality
It is shown that when the equilibrium set is discontinuous, bounded rationality can have a very large impact on behavior in the neighborhood of the discontinuity and it follows that a model is robust to bounded rationality if and only if it is structurally stable. Expand
Some notes on Church's thesis and the theory of games
This paper considers games in normal form played by Turing Machines. The machines are fed as input all the relevent information and then are required to play the game. Some ‘impossibility’ resultsExpand
Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation
We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach anExpand
Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Costs
This paper investigates, in a simple risk-sharing framework, the extent to which the incompleteness of contracts could be attributed to the complexity costs associated with the writing and theExpand
Undescribable Events
We develop a model of undescribable events. Examples of events that are well understood by economic agents but are prohibitively difficult to describe in advance abound in real-life. This notion hasExpand