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Attack graphs are a valuable tool to network defenders, illustrating paths an attacker can use to gain access to a targeted network. Defenders can then focus their efforts on patching the vulnerabilities and configuration errors that allow the attackers the greatest amount of access. We have created a new type of attack graph, the multiple-prerequisite(More)
By accurately measuring risk for enterprise networks, attack graphs allow network defenders to understand the most critical threats and select the most effective countermeasures. This paper describes substantial enhancements to the NetSPA attack graph system required to model additional present-day threats (zero-day exploits and client-side attacks) and(More)
Defense in depth is a common strategy that uses layers of firewalls to protect Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) subnets and other critical resources on enterprise networks. A tool named NetSPA is presented that analyzes firewall rules and vulnerabilities to construct attack graphs. These show how inside and outside attackers can progress by(More)
Attack graphs for large enterprise networks improve security by revealing critical paths used by adversaries to capture network assets. Even with simplification, current attack graph displays are complex and difficult to relate to the underlying physical networks. We have developed a new interactive tool intended to provide a simplified and more intuitive(More)
Attack graphs are valuable tools in the assessment of network security, revealing potential attack paths an adversary could use to gain control of network assets. Creating an effective visualization for attack graphs is essential to their utility, but many previous efforts produce complex displays that are difficult to relate to the underlying networks.(More)
A new tool named NAVIGATOR (Network Asset VIsualization: Graphs, ATtacks, Operational Recommendations) adds significant capabilities to earlier work in attack graph visualization. Using NAVIGATOR, users can visualize the effect of server-side, client-side, credential-based, and trust-based attacks. By varying the attacker model, NAVIGATOR can show the(More)
Weak physical unclonable functions (PUFs) can instantiate read-proof hardware tokens (Tuyls et al. 2006, CHES) where benign variation, such as changing temperature, yields a consistent key, but invasive attempts to learn the key destroy it. Previous approaches evaluate security by measuring how much an invasive attack changes the derived key (Pappu et al.(More)