Kyle Hyndman

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17β-Estradiol is the most potent natural estrogen commonly found in anthropogenically altered environments and has been the focus of many toxicological laboratory studies. However, fewer aquatic toxicological data on the effects of 17α-estradiol, a diastereoisomer of 17β-estradiol, exists in the literature even though it has been found in the aquatic(More)
We study coalition formation in “real time”, a situation in which coalition formation is intertwined with the ongoing receipt of pay-offs. Agreements are assumed to be permanently binding: They can only be altered with the full consent of existing signatories. For characteristic function games we prove that equilibrium processes—whether or not these are(More)
Temporal and spatial variability in estrogenicity has been documented for many treated wastewater effluents with the consequences of this variability on the expression of biomarkers of endocrine disruption being largely unknown. Laboratory exposure studies usually utilize constant exposure concentrations which may produce biological effects that differ from(More)
Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as a steady state where players hold correct beliefs about the other players’ behavior and act rationally. We experimentally examine the process that leads to this steady state. Our results indicate that some players emerge as “teachers” — those subjects who, by their actions, try to influence the beliefs of their(More)
T paper provides a test of a theory of social learning through endogenous information acquisition. A group of subjects face a decision problem under uncertainty. Subjects are endowed with private information about the fundamentals of the problem and make decisions sequentially. The key feature of the experiment is that subjects can observe the decisions of(More)
This paper studies the role of strategic teaching in coordination games and whether changing the incentives of players to teach leads to more efficient coordination. We ran experiments where subjects played one of four coordination games in constant pairings, where the incentives to teach were varied along two dimensions – the short run cost of teaching and(More)
We study the problem of a two-firm supply chain in which firms simultaneously choose a capacity before demand is realized. We focus on the role that private information about demand has on firms’ ability to align their capacity decisions. When forecasts are private information, there are at most two equilibria: a complete coordination failure or a monotone(More)
One way to define a Nash equilibrium is by positing a set of beliefs (or conjectures) for each player over (about) the actions of their opponents that has the property that, given these beliefs, when each player best responds, the actions taken confirm the initial beliefs. This rational expectations definition leaves open the question of how beliefs and(More)
This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment designed to investigate whether the option of a Prize Linked Savings (PLS) product alters the likelihood that subjects choose to delay payment. By comparing PLS and standard savings products in a controlled way, we find strong evidence that a PLS payment option leads to greater rates of payment(More)