Kurt Sylvan

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Suppose you and I disagree about p. I think p, you think ¬p. And suppose that we are epistemic peers about whether p. For our purposes there are two conditions for epistemic peerhood. First, we both have the same evidence with respect to p. Second, I think that you are just as smart as I am and just as likely as I am to get it right about p-like questions,(More)
In this paper, we claim that, if you justifiably believe that you ought to perform some act, it follows that you ought to perform that act. In the first half, we argue for this claim by reflection on what makes for correct reasoning from beliefs about what you ought to do. In the second half, we consider a number of objections to this argument and its(More)
A normative reason for a person to φ is a consideration which favours φing. A motivating reason is a reason for which or on the basis of which a person φs. This paper explores a connection between normative and motivating reasons. More specifically, it explores the idea that there are second-order normative reasons (not) to φ for or on the basis of certain(More)
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