Kristopher W. Ramsay

Learn More
While most existing theoretical and experimental literatures focus on how a high probability of repeated play can lead to more socially efficient outcomes (for instance, using the result that cooperation is possible in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma), this paper focuses on the detrimental effects of repeated play—the ‘‘dark side of the future.’’ I study a(More)
We study two different varieties of uncertainty that countries can face in international crises and establish general results about the relationship between these sources of uncertainty and the possibility of peaceful resolution of conflict. Among our results, we show that under some weak conditions, there is no equilibrium of any crisis bargaining game(More)
In “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” Robert Pape (2003) presents an analysis of his suicide terrorism data. He uses the data to draw inferences about how territorial occupation and religious extremism affect the decision of terrorist groups to use suicide tactics. We show that the data are incapable of supporting Pape’s conclusions because he(More)
a r t i c l e i n f o Cross-dated chronologies derived from internal growth increments in the shells of the long-lived bivalve, the dog cockle Glycymeris glycymeris (Linnaeus, 1758), live-collected from two different sites off the east (1997) and south (2009) coasts of the Isle of Man respectively, are described. The chronologies, developed from ten(More)
We investigate theoretically and experimentally the “crisis bargaining model,” a dynamic game of two-sided incomplete information with player types drawn from a commonly known distribution. Little work has been done to analyze whether and how players update their beliefs in such games. Within the experiment we elicited beliefs from players about their(More)
We develop a dynamic theory of resource wars and study the conditions under which such wars can be prevented. The interaction between the scarcity of resources and the incentives for war in the presence of limited commitment is at the center of our theory. We show that a key parameter determining the incentives for war is the elasticity of demand. Our …rst(More)
Working with the definition of mutual optimism as war due to inconsistent beliefs, we formalize the mutual optimism argument and show that in a strategic setting; if war is a “public event” when it occurs, then it cannot occur because of mutual optimism. That is, we show that for a general class of games where countries contemplate war, there is no(More)
We consider the bargaining problem between two players who may invest ex ante in the value of the disagreement payoff of the bargaining protocol. As is the case in war and other interesting political environments, we assume that the disagreement payoffs have interdependent components that are a function of both investments. We characterize necessary(More)
The evolution of cooperation in nature and human societies depends crucially on how the benefits from cooperation are divided and whether individuals have complete information about their payoffs. We tackle these questions by adopting a methodology from economics called mechanism design. Focusing on reproductive skew as a case study, we show that full(More)