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Clark and Chalmers (1998) claim that an external resource satisfying the following criteria counts as a memory: (1) the agent has constant access to the resource; (2) the information in the resource is directly available; (3) retrieved information is automatically endorsed; (4) information is stored as a consequence of past endorsement. Research on(More)
According to the hypotheses of distributed and extended cognition, remembering does not always occur entirely inside the brain but is often distributed across heterogeneous systems combining neural, bodily, social, and technological resources. These ideas have been intensely debated in philosophy, but the philosophical debate has often remained at some(More)
Klein's target article argues that autonoetic consciousness is a necessary condition for memory; this unusually narrow view of the scope of memory implies that only episodic memory is, strictly speaking, memory. The narrow view is opposed to the standard broad view, on which causal connection with past experience is sufficient for memory; on the broad view,(More)
The Psychology of How We Perceive Time Marc Wittmann translated by Erik Butler An expert explores the riddle of subjective time, from why time speeds up as we grow older to the connection between time and consciousness. Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past Kourken Michaelian Drawing on current research in psychology , a new philosophical(More)
The main claim of this relatively brief but unusually ambitious book is, as the title suggests, that the self is not one but two. On the one hand, there is the epistemological self, which has a definite neurocognitive basis. On the other hand, there is the ontological self, which, in Klein's view, is a matter of first-person subjectivity and may lack a(More)
This article argues for a task-based approach to identifying and individuating cognitive systems. The agent-based extended cognition approach faces a problem of cognitive bloat and has difficulty accommodating both sub-individual cognitive systems (“scaling down”) and some supra-individual cognitive systems (“scaling up”). The standard distributed cognition(More)
This article develops a taxonomy of memory errors in terms of three conditions: the accuracy of the memory representation, the reliability of the memory process, and the internality (with respect to the remembering subject) of that process. Unlike previous taxonomies, which appeal to retention of information rather than reliability or internality, this(More)
As the first to provide a thorough overview of the history of philosophical thinking about memory, this book fills an important gap in the literature (Nikulin, 2015). Despite some minor omissions in its coverage and some unusual features of its format (see below), Dmitri Nikulin's edited collection does an admirable job of providing a synoptic view of(More)