Konrad J. Kulikowski

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Balanced dynamic dual-rail gates and asynchronous circuits have been shown, if implemented correctly, to have natural and efficient resistance to side-channel attacks. Despite their benefits for security applications they have not been adapted to current mainstream designs due to the lack of electronic design automation support and their non-standard or(More)
The early propagation effect found in many logic gates is a potential source of data-dependent power consumption. We show that the effect and the corresponding power dependency can be targeted for successful power analysis attacks in cryptographic hardware. Many of the current balanced gate designs did not directly consider the effect and are vulnerable to(More)
Balanced gates are an effective countermeasure against power analysis attacks only if they can be guaranteed to maintain their power balance. Traditional testing and reliability methods are used primarily only to ensure the correctness of the logical functionality and not the balance of a circuit. Due to the hardware redundancy in balanced gate designs,(More)
We present a method of protecting a hardware implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) against a side-channel attack known as Differential Fault Analysis attack. The method uses systematic nonlinear (cubic) robust error detecting codes. Error-detecting capabilities of these codes depend not just on error patterns (as in the case of linear(More)
We present two architectures for protecting a hardware implementation of AES against side-channel attacks known as Differential Fault Analysis attacks. The first architecture, which is efficient for faults of higher multiplicity, partitions the design into linear (XOR gates only) and nonlinear blocks and uses different protection schemes for these blocks.(More)
The adaptive and active nature of fault based side-channel attacks along with the large arsenal of fault injection methods complicates the design of effective countermeasures. To overcome the unpredictability of fault attackers protection methods based on robust codes were proposed which can provide uniform error detection against all errors eliminating(More)
Linear SEC-DED codes used for protection of memories cannot detect and also miscorrect many errors with large Hamming weights. As multiple bit upsets become more probable for new technologies the reliability of memories protected by linear error correcting codes (ECC) can not be guaranteed. In this paper we propose to protect memory devices using a class of(More)
Hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms are vulnerable to fault analysis attacks. To detect these attacks we propose an architecture based on robust nonlinear systematic (n,k)-error-detecting codes. These nonlinear codes offer advantages over linear codes since they are capable of providing uniform error detecting coverage independently of the(More)
In this paper we propose memory protection architectures based on nonlinear single-error-correcting, double-error-detecting (SEC-DED) codes. Linear SEC-DED codes widely used for design of reliable memories cannot detect and can miscorrect lots of errors with large Hamming weights. This may be a serious disadvantage for many modern technologies when error(More)