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- Eddie Dekel, Barton L. Lipman, +7 authors Klaus Nehring
- 2000

We extend Kreps’ (1979) analysis of preference for flexibility, reinterpreted by Kreps (1992) as a model of unforeseen contingencies. We enrich the choice set, consequently obtaining uniqueness results that were not possible in Kreps’ model. We consider several representations and allow the agent to prefer commitment in some contingencies. In the… (More)

- Klaus Nehring, Clemens Puppe
- J. Economic Theory
- 2010

Arrowian Aggregation*

- Klaus Nehring
- 2002

Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem is derived from a general theorem on social aggregation in “property spaces”. In the present proof, the weak-order structure of the domain and co-domain of the aggregation plays a purely combinatorial role.

- Klaus Nehring, Clemens Puppe
- J. Economic Theory
- 2007

We define a general notion of single-peaked preferences based on abstract betweenness relations. Special cases are the classical example of single-peaked preferences on a line, the separable preferences on the hypercube, the “multi-dimensionally singlepeaked” preferences on the product of lines, but also the unrestricted preference domain. Generalizing and… (More)

- Klaus Nehring
- 1996

This is the working-paper version of the published article, “Preference for Flexibility in a Savage Framework”, 1999, Econometrica 67, 121-146. The last three sections consist of additional material on the uniqueness of the representation (s. 5), interpretation in terms of freedom of choice (s. 6), and an alternative motivation for departing from the Savage… (More)

- Klaus Nehring, Clemens Puppe
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2007

The paper provides a characterization of all efficient and strategy-proof voting mechamisms on a large class of preference domains, the class of all generalized single-peaked domains. It is shown that a strategy-proof voting mechanism on such a domain is efficient if and only if it satisfies a weak neutrality condition and is either almost dictatorial, or… (More)

- Klaus Nehring, Clemens Puppe
- Electronic Notes in Discrete Mathematics
- 1999

- Klaus Nehring
- 2005

We consider situations in which a group takes a collective decision by aggregating individual’s judgments on a set of criteria according to some agreed-upon decision functions. Assuming the criteria and the decision to be binary, we demonstrate that, except when the aggregation rule is dictatorial or the decision rule is particularly simple, such… (More)

- Eddie Dekel, Barton L. Lipman, +4 authors Rani Spiegler
- 1997

We axiomatically characterize a representation of preferences over opportunity sets which exhibit a preference for °exibility, interpreted as a model of unforeseen contingencies. In this representation, the agent acts as if she had a coherent prior over a set of possible future preferences, each of which is an expected{utility preference. We show that the… (More)

- Klaus Nehring, Marcus Pivato, Clemens Puppe
- J. Economic Theory
- 2014

Judgement aggregation is a model of social choice in which the space of social alternatives is the set of consistent evaluations (‘views’) on a family of logically interconnected propositions, or yes/no-issues. Yet, simply complying with the majority opinion in each issue often yields a logically inconsistent collection of judgements. Thus, we consider the… (More)