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Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have… (More)
- Klaus M. Schmidt, Monika Schnitzer, Joachim Henkel, Justin Johnson, Bernard Reddy
- 2002
This paper discusses the economic merits of direct or indirect governmental support for open source projects. Software markets differ from standard textbook markets in three important respects that… (More)
- Patrick D’Souza, Georg Gebhardt, John Moore, Georg Nöldeke, Klaus M. Schmidt
- 1999
This paper offers a new explanation for the prevalent use of convertible securities in venture capital finance. Convertible securities can be used to endogenously allocate cash flow rights as a… (More)
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and… (More)
- Klaus M. Schmidt
- 1999
Let α be an expansive automorphisms of compact connected abelian group X whose dual group X̂ is cyclic w.r.t. α (i.e. X̂ is generated by {χ · α : n ∈ Z} for some χ ∈ X̂). Then there exists a… (More)
This paper examines how the presence of a non-negligible fraction of reciprocally fair actors changes the provision of incentives through contracts. We provide experimental evidence that principals… (More)
This paper reports on a two-task principal–agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus… (More)
Contingent ownership structures are prevalent in joint ventures. This paper o ers an explanation based on the investment incentives provided by such an arrangement. We consider a hold-up problem in… (More)
A major puzzle in the literature on social preferences is that a large majority of subjects behaves as if completely self-interested in some circumstances, such as in competitive experimental markets… (More)
- Klaus M. Schmidt, Monika Schnitzer
- 2007
We analyze explicit and implicit contracts in a repeated principal-agent model with observable but only partially contractible actions of the agent. It is shown that the set of implementable actions… (More)