Kishore Gawande

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Do contributions levels matter for endogenous protection or is the existence of a lobby sufficient? Are lobbies' net benefits from protection identical to their contribution levels, or does the level of protection simply reflect contribution levels of supporters and opponents? We estimate the Influence Driven (Grossman and Helpman, 1994) and the Tariff(More)
This paper empirically examines the alternative posed by Richardson [J. Intern. Econ. 34 (1993) 39] to the traditional view that trade integration may exacerbate inefficiencies. Richardson's hypothesis boldly predicts that trade diversion (and trade creation) may actually cause tariffs to decline! The hypothesis is fundamentally attributable to the presence(More)
Regional agreements on standards have been largely ignored by economists and blessed by multilateral trade rules. Using a constructed panel data that identifies the different types of agreements at the industry level, we find that such agreements increase the trade between participating countries but not necessarily with the rest of the world. Harmonization(More)
We provide new survey evidence showing that loss aversion and reference dependence are important in shaping people's preferences over trade policy. Under the assumption that agents' welfare functions exhibit these behavioral elements, we analyze a model with a welfare-maximizing government and with the lobbying framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994). The(More)
Policy making power enables governments to redistribute income to powerful interests in society. However, some governments exhibit greater concern for aggregate welfare than others. This government behavior may itself be endogenously determined by a number of economic, political and institutional factors. Trade policy, being fundamentally redistributive,(More)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings,(More)
Government exchange rate regime choice is constrained by both political and economic factors. One political factor is the role of special interests: the larger the tradable sectors exposed to international competition, the less likely is the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate regime. Another political factor is electoral: as an election approaches, the(More)
Is there a causal relationship between shocks to natural resources and the intensity of conflict? This question has been subject to an intense debate between those who argue for and against such a causal relationship. The latter group has highlighted the methodological flaws that underpin the claims of the former group, with particular emphasis being laid(More)