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The Epistemic Value of Deep Disagreements
In the epistemology of disagreement literature an underdeveloped argument defending the claim that an agent need not conciliate when she becomes aware of epistemic peer disagreement is based on theExpand
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Indirect epistemic reasons and religious belief
If believing P will result in epistemically good outcomes, does this generate an epistemic reason to believe P, or just a pragmatic reason? Conceiving of such reasons as epistemic reasons seems toExpand
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Catherine Elgin on peerhood and the epistemic benefits of disagreement
Conciliationism is the view that an agent must revise her belief in a proposition when she becomes aware that there is an epistemic peer who disagrees with her about that proposition. If epistemicExpand
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The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement
  • Kirk Lougheed
  • Psychology, Computer Science
  • Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and…
  • 21 January 2020
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Anti-Theism, Pro-Theism, and Gratuitous Evil