Kim-Sau Chung

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We study an auction design problem where the auctioneer anticipates that bidders collude tacitly. We model tacit collusion in the following way: whichever auction the auctioneer announces, it becomes the stage game of a corresponding repeated game, and out of all sequential equilibria of the resulting repeated game, bidders play the one that maximizes their(More)
We study how the presence of non-exclusive contracts limits the amount of insurance provided in a decentralized economy. We consider a dynamic Mirrleesian economy in which agents are privately informed about idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks. Agents sign privately observable insurance contracts with multiple firms (i.e., they are non-exclusive), which(More)
Every abstract type of a belief-closed type space corresponds to an infinite belief hierarchy. But only finite order of beliefs is necessary for most applications. As we demonstrate, many important insights from recent development in the theory of Bayesian games with higher-order uncertainty involve belief hierarchies of order 2. We start with(More)
People with time-inconsistent preferences tend to make intertemporal choices different from their original intentions. In particular, time-inconsistent agents make sub-optimal saving decisions. This paper studies the optimal savings and insurance policy in an economy with time-inconsistent agents who privately observe their skill. I introduce a mechanism(More)
  • B Curtis Eaton, Krishna Pendakur, Clyde G Reed, Simon Fraser University, George Akerlof, Jay Allen +12 others
  • 2006
Socializing is an important economic activity. A critical input into the activity of socializing is the set of experiences— especially cultural experiences— that is shared by participants. Our model of this link provides an explanation of a number of interesting mass culture phenomena, including certain sorts of conformity, the domination of one culture by(More)
  • T H E N E W E M P I R I C S O F E C O N O M I C G R O W T H, Steven N Durlauf, Danny T Quah, Kim-Sau Chung, Donald Hester, Brian Krauth +6 others
  • 2004
Contents Abstract Keywords 1. Introduction 2. Preliminaries and stylized facts 3. Theoretical models 4. F r o m theory to empirical analysis 4.1. The neoclassical model: one capital good, exogenous technical progress 4.2. The neoclassical model: multiple capital goods 4.3. Endogenous growth: asymptotically linear technology 4.4. Nonconvexities and poverty(More)
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