If potential donors for a charity project possess the warm-glow properties in their preferences, we can represent their behavior with a coordination game. Accordingly, we construct a simultaneousâ€¦ (More)

We consider the allotment problem of homogeneous indivisible goods among agents with single-peaked and risk-averse von NeumannMorgenstern expected utility functions. We establish that a ruleâ€¦ (More)

Following BarberÃ , Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigateâ€¦ (More)

We consider the problem of allocating infinitely divisible goods among agents. Especially, we focus on the case where there are several goods to be allocated, and agents have continuous, strictlyâ€¦ (More)

This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems. Alcalde and BarberÃ¡ (1994) show that efficient and individually rational matchingâ€¦ (More)

We consider the allotment problem of homogeneous indivisible goods among agents with single-peaked and risk-averse von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility functions. We establish that a ruleâ€¦ (More)

We consider the election model in which voters choose a subset from the set of candidates. Both voters and candidates are assumed to possess preferences with separable strict orderings. Weâ€¦ (More)

We consider the election model in which voters choose a subset from the set of candidates. Both voters and candidates are assumed to possess preferences with separable strict orderings. Weâ€¦ (More)