Kenneth W. Shotts

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W e show that the butterfly ballot used in Palm Beach County, Florida, in the 2000 presidential election caused more than 2,000 Democratic voters to vote by mistake for Reform candidate Pat Buchanan, a number larger than George W. Bush’s certified margin of victory in Florida. We use multiple methods and several kinds of data to rule out alternative(More)
Elections sometimes give policy-makers incentives to pander, i.e., to implement a policy that voters think is in their best interest, even though the policy-maker knows that a different policy is actually better for the voter. Pandering incentives are typically attenuated when voters learn, prior to the election, whether the policy chosen by the incumbent(More)
Incentives in voting models typically hinge on the event that a voter is pivotal. But voting can also in‡uence the future behavior of political elites. In this paper, we consider a model in which voters have private information about their policy preferences and an election is held in each of two periods. In this setting, a vote in the …rst period can have(More)
This Online Appendix is divided into three parts. Appendix A proves results in the main text. Appendix B is a complete treatment of the general model (which allows each entrepreneur to value the quality of her opponent’s policies at (1 ) q i) and proves Lemma 1, which contains necessary conditions for equilibrium. Appendix C is a complete treatment of the(More)
Since Herron and Shotts (2003a; hereinafter HS), Adolph and King (2003; hereinafter AK), and Herron and Shotts (2003b; hereinafter HS2), the four of us have iterated many more times, learned a great deal, and arrived at a consensus on this issue. This paper describes our joint recommendations for how to run second-stage ecological regressions, and provides(More)
In political organizations, the process of developing new policies often involves competing policy entrepreneurs who make productive investments to make their proposals more appealing to decisionmakers. We analyze how entrepreneursí extremism and costs of crafting high-quality proposals a§ect patterns of competition and policy outcomes. A centrist(More)
We develop a game-theoretic model that identifies conditions under which a political executive will be satisfied with the actions of an appointee who decides whether to investigate possible legal violations. Because investigations are a necessary precondition for enforcement, the investigator exerts significant influence over whether, and the extent to(More)
We analyze a model of policymaking in which only one actor, e.g., a bureaucratic agency or a wellfunded interest group, has the capacity to develop high-quality policy proposals. By virtue of her skills, this actor has an e§ective monopoly on policy development and thus can craft proposals that are good for herself but provide few benefits to decisionmakers(More)