This paper studies interactive learning processes that are subject to constant perturbations or "noise." We argue that payoffs in the Ultimatum Game are such that responders are more apt to be "noisy" than are proposers and show that as a result the learning process readily leads to outcomes that are Nash equilibria but not subgame-perfect. We conclude that… (More)
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Selten (1980, J. theor. Biol. 84, 93(N)/01) has shown that mixed strategies cannot be evolutionarily stable in asymmetric games. Because every interaction features some asymmetry, this result apparently precludes mixed strategies in an evolutionary setting. In Maynard Smith's Hawk-Dove game (1982, Evolution and the theory of games (UP-Cambridge), for… (More)
Werner Güth's ultimatum game played a key role in the development of multiple research areas, several of which are highlighted.