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With existing technology, it is already possible for personal agents to schedule meetings for their users, to write the small print of an agreement, and for agents to search the Internet for the cheapest price. But serious negotiation cranks the difficulty of the problem up several notches. In this paper, we review what game theory has to offer in the light(More)
This paper examines evolutionary equilibrium selection in bargaining models. We show that random best-response and continuous best-response learning dynamics give rise to (different) simple sufficient conditions for identifying outcomes as stochastically stable. This allows us to characterize the implications of these dynamics in simple bargaining games.
This paper develops an approach to equilibrium selection in game theory based on studying. the learning process through which equilibrium is achieved. The differential equations derived from models of interactive learning typically have stationary states that are not isolated. Instead, Nash equilibria that specify different out-of-equilibrium behaviour(More)
This paper characterizes modified evolutiona.rily stable strategies (MESSes) in Rubinstein's alternating-offers, infinite-horizon bargaining game. The MESS concept modifies the idea of an neutrally stable strategy by favoring a simple strategy over a more complex strategy when both yield the same pay-off. Our complexity notion is weaker than the common(More)
Experimental results on the Ellsberg paradox typically reveal behavior that is commonly interpreted as ambiguity aversion. The experiments reported in the current paper find the objective probabilities for drawing a red ball that make subjects indifferent between various risky and uncertain Ellsberg bets. They allow us to examine the predictive power of(More)
1 1 We thank Menesh Patel and John Straub for research assistance and thank Vince Crawford for helpful comments. The instructions and data for the experiments reported in this paper are posted at This paper reports experiments with one-stage and two-stage alternating-offers bargaining games. Payoff-interdependent preferences have been suggested as an(More)