Kazuhiko Hashimoto

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In this paper, we consider a relationship between equity and efficiency in queueing problems. We show that under strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare implies queue-efficiency. Furthermore, we also give a characterization of the equally distributed pairwise pivotal rule, as the only rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare and(More)
We consider the problem of probabilistically allocating a single indivisible good among agents when monetary transfers are allowed. We construct a new strategy-proof rule, called the second price trading rule, and show that it is second best efficient. Furthermore, we give the second price trading rule three characterizations with (1) strategy-proofness, "(More)
MUNAP (MUlti-NAnoProgram machine) is a two-level microprogrammed multiprocessor computer designed and developed at a university as a research vehicle. This paper describes the experiences with the implementation of MUNAP. We start with a brief overview of the machine. We then describe the system organization both on hardware and support software. The(More)
We consider the problem of probabilistically allocating a single indivisible good among agents when monetary transfers are allowed. We construct a new strategy-proof rule, called the second price trading rule, and show that it is second best efficient. Furthermore, we give the second price trading rule three characterizations with (1) strategy-proofness, "(More)
We consider the problem of allocating infinitely divisible goods among agents. Especially, we focus on the case where there are several goods to be allocated, and agents have continuous, strictly convex and separable preferences. In this paper, we establish that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, unanimity, symmetry, and(More)
This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that efficient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing efficiency to the weaker condition of(More)