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A definition of a utilitarian social welfare relation (SWR) for infinite utility streams is proposed. Such a relation is characterized in terms of the Pareto, Anonymity and Partial Unit Comparability Axioms. The merits of the utilitarian SWR, relative to the more restrictive SWR induced by the overtaking criterion, are examined.
find that the airline has damaged the identical antiques that each had purchased. An airline manager says that he is happy to compensate them but is handicapped by being clueless about the value of these strange objects. Simply asking the travelers for the price is hopeless, he figures, for they will inflate it. Instead he devises a more complicated scheme.(More)
Acknowledgements Our greatest debt is to the three referees for their numerous suggestions for improvements in the paper. For helpful comments, we are also grateful to Abstract The classical theory of rational choice is built on several important internal consistency conditions. In recent years, the reasonableness of those internal consistency conditions(More)
Both raw intuition and past experience suggest that the success of an employment guarantee scheme (EGS) in safeguarding the welfare of the poor depends both on the wage it promises, and the ease with which any worker can gain access. An EGS is thus at once a wage guarantee and a rationing device. We chart the positive and normative limits of such an EGS as(More)
Suppose theft is allowed but allowing theft is in no one's self-interest, and forward-looking individuals with rational expectations vote each period whether or not to create third party enforcement that suppresses theft (the " rule of law "). Will individuals with control rights over enterprises vote for the rule of law? If individuals anticipate a delay(More)
The views expressed are those of the authors and not those of the institutions with which they are affiliated. We are grateful for helpful comments from seminar audiences at the most of all, to two anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions. Remaining shortcomings are our responsibility. Abstract This paper examines the composition of trade(More)
Most standard solution concepts of extensive games are history-insensitive in the sense that no matter at which information set one is, it is assumed that each player believes that everybody else is rational. In reality, each history of moves reveals certain traits of the players to one another. It is argued in this paper that solution concepts ought to(More)