A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics
- Kathleen Bawn, Martin Cohen, David Karol, S. Masket, Hans Noel, J. Zaller
- Political SciencePerspectives on Politics
- 16 August 2012
We propose a theory of political parties in which interest groups and activists are the key actors, and coalitions of groups develop common agendas and screen candidates for party nominations based…
Short versus Long Coalitions: Electoral Accountability and the Size of the Public Sector
- Kathleen Bawn, F. Rosenbluth
- Political Science, Economics
- 1 April 2006
This article examines the policy consequences of the number of parties in government. We argue that parties externalize costs not borne by their support groups. Larger parties thus internalize more…
Voter Responses to Electoral Complexity: Ticket Splitting, Rational Voters and Representation in the Federal Republic of Germany
- Kathleen Bawn
- Political ScienceBritish Journal of Political Science
- 1 June 1999
In order to understand how electoral rules affect political outcomes, we need to know whether and how voters react to them. The ability of voters to react strategically to electoral rules may be…
Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures
- Kathleen Bawn
- Political ScienceAmerican Political Science Review
- 1 March 1995
Congressional choices about administrative procedures affect an agency's political responsiveness and the technical accuracy of its decisions. Legislators would like to design procedures so that…
The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome
- Kathleen Bawn
- Economics
- 1 November 1993
Institutions determine the results of social decision processes, yet institutions are themselves endogenous products of earlier social choices. This paper explores the hypothesis that participants in…
A Comparative Theory of Electoral Incentives
- Kathleen Bawn, Michael F. Thies
- Economics
- 1 January 2003
We expand Denzau and Munger’s 1986 model of ‘How Unorganized Interests Get Represented’ to address cross-national differences in electoral systems. We look at how individual legislators allocate…
Money and Majorities in the Federal Republic of Germany: Evidence for a Veto Players Model of Government Spending
- Kathleen Bawn
- Economics
- 1 July 1999
I formulate a veto players model of policy making by coalition government in the Federal Republic of Germany. The model gives testable predictions about how patterns of federal spending respond to…
Constructing "Us": Ideology, Coalition Politics, and False Consciousness
- Kathleen Bawn
- Economics, Sociology
- 1 April 1999
Ideology matters in politics because it causes people to care about issues in which they have no direct stake. Indeed, ideological preferences are often decisive in democratic decision making, as…
A Comparative Theory of Electoral Incentives: Representing the Unorganized Under PR, Plurality, and Mixed-Member Electoral Systems.
- Kathleen Bawn, Michael F. Thies
- Economics
- 2003
We expand Denzau and Munger's 1986 model of "How Unorganized Interests Get Represented" to address cross-national differences in electoral systems. We look at how individual legislators allocate…
Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System
- Kathleen Bawn
- Political Science
- 1 April 1997
Congress can exert control over regulatory agencies either through oversight or through statutory control provisions that establish agency structure and process. Each strategy has advantages and…
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