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Embodied cognition is a growing area of research within cognitive science—one that it is often presented as a framework that may help us account for cognition as a whole. It is, however, a theory and, as such, it must live up to the requirements that all scientific theories do. Of particular importance is the degree to which it is falsifiable. This paper(More)
Although relational reasoning has been described as a process at the heart of human cognition, the exact character of relational representations remains an open debate. Symbolic-connectionist models of relational cognition suggest that relations are structured representations, but that they are ultimately grounded in feature sets; thus, they predict that(More)
Relational recognition is the process by which relational representations get recognized (i.e., representations that specify an actor and a patient, and are role sensitive). This process is currently poorly understood, but is an important aspect of relational cognition (Livins & Doumas, 2014). This paper presents two experiments that investigate the degree(More)
Learning of feature-based categories is known to interact with feature-variation in a variety of ways, depending on the type of variation (e.g., Markman and Maddox, 2003). However, relational categories are distinct from feature-based categories in that they determine membership based on structural similarities. As a result, the way that they interact with(More)
While relational reasoning has been described as a process at the heart of human cognition, the degree to which relational representations can be primed remains an open debate. This paper will present a category-learning experiment that shows that the learning of spatial relations (above and below) can be primed using a subtle visuospatial stimulus that may(More)
Analogy is an important cognitive process that has been researched extensively. Functional accounts of it typically involve at least four stages of processing (access, mapping, transfer, and evaluation, e.g., see Kokinov & French, 2002), however, they take the way in which the base analog is understood, along with its relational structure, for granted. The(More)
Accounts of human mental representation typically posit either the sole existence of structured (i.e., totally symbolic) representations, or the sole existence of holistic (i.e., totally sub-symbolic, or connectionist) representations. We argue that systems that implement structured representations are not necessarily as different form those that represent(More)
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