Katalin Balog

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I wished to represent, in my own way, according to my own ideas, the material that was given to me, my material, myself.... But there is something that I – perhaps understandably – didn't take into account: that we cannot ever represent ourselves to ourselves. In this paper 1 I will lay the groundwork for an account of acquaintance and discuss the(More)
Frank Jackson's new book From Metaphysics to Ethics is impressive for the grand and coherent vision it offers of the connection between metaphysics and conceptual analysis. The structure of the proposal is both clear and simple. Here are the main outlines: a) One of the main tasks of metaphysics is to propose a kind of fact (or vocabulary) as fundamental(More)
In this paper I will discuss three problems concerning consciousness 1. The first two problems have been dubbed " The Hard Problem " 2 and " The Harder Problem " 3. The third problem has received less attention and I will call it " The Hardest Problem ". However, I do not really mean to indicate a competition among these problems as to which is the most(More)
During the last two decades there has been a resurgence of arguments against physicalism and for varieties of metaphysical dualism. The conclusion of these arguments is that phenomenal consciousness is absent from a world that is purely physical. Many contemporary philosophers of mind have found some of these arguments to be persuasive and have opted for(More)
Proponents of non-conceptual content have recruited it for various philosophical jobs. Some epistemologists have suggested that it may play the role of " the given " that Sellars is supposed to have exorcised from philosophy. Some philosophers of mind (e.g., Dretske) have suggested that it plays an important role in the project of naturalizing semantics as(More)
THIS chapter is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience. These are called 'phenomenal concepts' (PCs) and they are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character 1 of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experiences strike many(More)
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