Karl H. Schlag

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It is well established for evolutionary dynamics in asymmetric games that a pure strategy combination is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a strict Nash equilibrium. We use an extension of the notion of a strict Nash equilibrium to sets of strategy combinations called 'strict equilibrium set' and show the following. For a large class of(More)
We run an experiment in which participants are matched to a group of five and repeatedly have to choose with whom within their group they want to play a trust game. Within this group participants observe of each other age, gender, nationality and number of siblings. We find that difference in success in the experiment can only be explained in terms of(More)
We present the …rst genuine test for a unit root (or of any other value of the autoregressive coe¢ cient) within an autoregressive model for errors with given bounds that follow a martingale di¤erence sequence. Without such bounds nontrivial tests are known not to exist. Our test is exact, we do not add other assumptions on the process. Competitors either(More)