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- Karl H. Schlag
- 1996

We consider the situation in which individuals in a ¯nite population must repeatedly choose an action yielding an uncertain payo®. Between choices, each individual may observe the performance of one other individual. We search for rules of behavior with limited memory that increase expected pay-o®s for any underlying payo® distribution. It is shown that the… (More)

- Ludovic Renou, Karl H. Schlag
- J. Economic Theory
- 2010

This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider price-setting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate… (More)

- Karl H. Schlag
- 1993

The effect of cheap talk in partnership games on the evolutionary dynamics of homogeneous populations under symmetric and random matching is analyzed. As long as the message set is sufficiently large there exists an Asymptotically Stable Set with payoffs arbitrarily close to the maximal payoff for each player. However this only holds true for each… (More)

- Karl H. Schlag
- 1994

In consecutive rounds, each agent in a finite population chooses an action, is randomly matched, obtains a payoff and then observes the performance of another agent. An agent determines future behavior based on the information she receives from the present round. She chooses among the behavioral rules that increase expected payoffs in any specifications of… (More)

- ARTM IVER, Olivier Gossner, Karl Schlag
- 2012

- Dieter Balkenborg, Karl H. Schlag
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2001

Individuals belonging to two large populations are repeatedly randomly matched to play a cyclic 2 × 2 game such as Matching Pennies. Between matching rounds, individuals sometimes change their strategy after observing a finite sample of other outcomes within their population. Individuals from the same population follow the same behavioral rule. In the… (More)

- Karl H. Schlag
- 2006

1 The author would like to appologize. This paper was written in a rush to allow others to cite the results. Proofs yet have to be polished, examples recalculated, additional references added and existing references …ne tuned. In particular, if any reader feels that his or her work was not appropiately credited then this was not the intention of the author… (More)

We wish to thank Wolfgang Leininger for starting this project by asking us about the relevance of noise for evolutionary predictions. Abstract In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the… (More)

- Dieter Balkenborg, Karl H. Schlag
- J. Economic Theory
- 2007

It is well established for evolutionary dynamics in asymmetric games that a pure strategy combination is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a strict Nash equilibrium. We use an extension of the notion of a strict Nash equilibrium to sets of strategy combinations called 'strict equilibrium set' and show the following. For a large class of… (More)