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  • Coralio Ballestery, Antoni Calvó-Armengolz, +7 authors Sergio Vicente
  • 2005
Finite population non-cooperative games with linear-quadratic utilities, where each player decides how much action she exerts, can be interpreted as a network game with local payo¤ com-plementarities, together with a globally uniform payo¤ substitutability component and an own-concavity e¤ect. For these games, the Nash equilibrium action of each player is(More)
We consider the situation in which individuals in a ¯nite population must repeatedly choose an action yielding an uncertain payo®. Between choices, each individual may observe the performance of one other individual. We search for rules of behavior with limited memory that increase expected pay-o®s for any underlying payo® distribution. It is shown that the(More)
This essay is the introduction for a collection of papers by the two of us on " Robust Mechanism Design " to be published by World Scienti…c Publishing. The appendix of this essay lists the chapters of the book. The objective of this introductory essay is to provide the reader with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers. The(More)
This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider price-setting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate(More)
We use subjects' actions in modified dictator games to perform a within-subject classification of individuals into four different types of interdependent preferences: Selfish, Social Welfare maximizers, Inequity Averse and Competitive. We elicit beliefs about other subjects' actions in the same modified dictator games to test how much of the existent(More)
We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information. In the robust version of the problem the seller only knows that demand will be in a neighborhood of a given model distribution. We characterize the optimal pricing policy under two distinct, but related, decision criteria with multiple priors: (i)(More)
The effect of cheap talk in partnership games on the evolutionary dynamics of homogeneous populations under symmetric and random matching is analyzed. As long as the message set is sufficiently large there exists an Asymptotically Stable Set with payoffs arbitrarily close to the maximal payoff for each player. However this only holds true for each(More)