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We consider the situation in which individuals in a ¯nite population must repeatedly choose an action yielding an uncertain payo®. Between choices, each individual may observe the performance of one other individual. We search for rules of behavior with limited memory that increase expected pay-o®s for any underlying payo® distribution. It is shown that the(More)
This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider price-setting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate(More)
The effect of cheap talk in partnership games on the evolutionary dynamics of homogeneous populations under symmetric and random matching is analyzed. As long as the message set is sufficiently large there exists an Asymptotically Stable Set with payoffs arbitrarily close to the maximal payoff for each player. However this only holds true for each(More)
In consecutive rounds, each agent in a finite population chooses an action, is randomly matched, obtains a payoff and then observes the performance of another agent. An agent determines future behavior based on the information she receives from the present round. She chooses among the behavioral rules that increase expected payoffs in any specifications of(More)
It is well established for evolutionary dynamics in asymmetric games that a pure strategy combination is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a strict Nash equilibrium. We use an extension of the notion of a strict Nash equilibrium to sets of strategy combinations called 'strict equilibrium set' and show the following. For a large class of(More)