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This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider price-setting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate… (More)

It is well established for evolutionary dynamics in asymmetric games that a pure strategy combination is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a strict Nash equilibrium. We use an extension of the notion of a strict Nash equilibrium to sets of strategy combinations called 'strict equilibrium set' and show the following. For a large class of… (More)

We wish to thank Wolfgang Leininger for starting this project by asking us about the relevance of noise for evolutionary predictions, and Wieland Müller and Larry Samuelson for contributing valuable comments. Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFBs 303 and 373 is gratefully acknowledged. Abstract In a recent paper Bagwell… (More)

- Karl H Schlag
- 1993

The effect of cheap talk in partnership games on the evolutionary dynamics of homogeneous populations under symmetric and random matching is analyzed. As long as the message set is sufficiently large there exists an Asymptotically Stable Set with payoffs arbitrarily close to the maximal payoff for each player. However this only holds true for each… (More)

- Andrea Ichino, Oliver Kirchkamp, Karl H Schlag, Eyal Winter, Francesco Caselli, Colin Crouch +5 others
- 2009

We run an experiment in which participants are matched to a group of five and repeatedly have to choose with whom within their group they want to play a trust game. Within this group participants observe of each other age, gender, nationality and number of siblings. We find that difference in success in the experiment can only be explained in terms of… (More)

This note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents. We postulate the concept of ε-minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are Maskin monotonic and satisfy the no-veto power condition are… (More)

We consider an agent who has to repeatedly make choices in an uncertain and changing environment, who has full information of the past, who discounts future payoffs, but who has no prior. We provide a learning algorithm that performs almost as well as the best of a given finite number of experts or benchmark strategies and does so at any point in time,… (More)

- Heiko Rachinger, Karl H Schlag
- 2015

We present the …rst genuine test for a unit root (or of any other value of the autoregressive coe¢ cient) within an autoregressive model for errors with given bounds that follow a martingale di¤erence sequence. Without such bounds nontrivial tests are known not to exist. Our test is exact, we do not add other assumptions on the process. Competitors either… (More)